Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- In Memoriam
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Asia
- 2 Shareholder Voting and Engagement in China
- 3 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Hong Kong
- 4 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in India
- 5 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement Practices in Indonesia: A Shifting Paradigm
- 6 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Japan
- 7 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Singapore
- 8 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in South Korea
- 9 Shareholder Voting and Engagement in Taiwan
- Part II Australia and North America
- Part III Europe
- Part IV Comparative Perspectives
- Index
2 - Shareholder Voting and Engagement in China
from Part I - Asia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 September 2022
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- In Memoriam
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Asia
- 2 Shareholder Voting and Engagement in China
- 3 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Hong Kong
- 4 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in India
- 5 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement Practices in Indonesia: A Shifting Paradigm
- 6 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Japan
- 7 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in Singapore
- 8 Shareholder Engagement and Voting in South Korea
- 9 Shareholder Voting and Engagement in Taiwan
- Part II Australia and North America
- Part III Europe
- Part IV Comparative Perspectives
- Index
Summary
Empowerment of minority shareholders has been a central theme of China’s corporate governance movements in the past two decades. Cumulative voting and the majority of the minority rule are exemplary of Chinese reformers’ efforts to strengthen shareholders’ rights to vote. Other shareholders’ rights, such as the right to call a meeting, the right to propose, and the right to information, are also in place and, at least in theory, enable public shareholders to engage the controlling shareholders of their investee companies. The practical effect of these legal rights needs to be evaluated in the context of China’s path-dependent conditions, notably the prevalence of concentrated share ownership, the relatively weaker presence of institutional investors, and the approach to allocating corporate power which centres on the shareholders meeting.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022