Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume II
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume II
- 1 The Strategies of the Napoleonic Wars
- 2 Guerrilla and Nineteenth-Century Strategies of Insurgency
- 3 Russia, 1877–1917
- 4 The American Civil War
- 5 The Use of Naval Power
- 6 The Russo-Japanese War
- 7 Chinese Strategy, 1926–1949
- 8 First World War
- 9 Soviet Strategy, 1917–1945
- 10 Air Power
- 11 The Second World War in Europe
- 12 The Second World War in the Asia–Pacific
- 13 Soviet Strategy, 1945–1989
- 14 People’s War and Wars of Decolonisation
- 15 Nuclear Strategies
- 16 America’s Way of War
- 17 The Korean War
- 18 Israel’s Wars
- 19 The India–Pakistan Confrontations
- 20 The Yugoslav War, 1991–1999
- 21 Terrorism and Insurgency
- 22 The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan
- 23 The Three Gulf Wars and Iraq
- 24 China’s Wars, 1950–2021
- Conclusion
- Further Reading
- Index
4 - The American Civil War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume II
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume II
- 1 The Strategies of the Napoleonic Wars
- 2 Guerrilla and Nineteenth-Century Strategies of Insurgency
- 3 Russia, 1877–1917
- 4 The American Civil War
- 5 The Use of Naval Power
- 6 The Russo-Japanese War
- 7 Chinese Strategy, 1926–1949
- 8 First World War
- 9 Soviet Strategy, 1917–1945
- 10 Air Power
- 11 The Second World War in Europe
- 12 The Second World War in the Asia–Pacific
- 13 Soviet Strategy, 1945–1989
- 14 People’s War and Wars of Decolonisation
- 15 Nuclear Strategies
- 16 America’s Way of War
- 17 The Korean War
- 18 Israel’s Wars
- 19 The India–Pakistan Confrontations
- 20 The Yugoslav War, 1991–1999
- 21 Terrorism and Insurgency
- 22 The Forty-Year War in Afghanistan
- 23 The Three Gulf Wars and Iraq
- 24 China’s Wars, 1950–2021
- Conclusion
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
The Civil War provides an example of a war between two democratic powers with similar constitutions, styles of government and military culture. This helps produce some similarities in strategy making (particularly the role of commanding generals) but also distinct differences, such as the control exercised by respective presidents. The differences in approach are apparent from the beginning of the war. The initial Confederate strategy of a cordon defense arose not from its president, Jefferson Davis, or his officials but from governors and commanders in the field. The Union’s initial strategy, the Anaconda Plan, came from the Union General in Chief, Winfield Scott. This position gave the Union’s creation of strategy a focus which the Confederates did not possess, leading to poor co-ordination of military forces across the Confederacy and weak political control of the South’s generals. This produced blunders such as the Confederate invasion of Kentucky – which had declared itself neutral – without Davis’s knowledge or consent. This was also an example of poor political military control in the South. By comparison, the leadership of Abraham Lincoln – after a weak start – provides an interesting case of the beneficial effects of strong political leadership in the creation and execution of strategy.
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- The Cambridge History of Strategy , pp. 79 - 98Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025