Introduction

Summary

A cause ensures that its effects are no coincidence. That is the central claim of this book and it is, at first sight, a familiar one. If the trespasser left the field a moment ago because he had just observed the entry of a bull, then his leaving the field at that moment was no coincidence. The arrival of the bull ensured that he would leave the field without delay. On the other hand, had the trespasser failed to spot the bull prior to his departure from the field then, as far as the presence of the bull goes, it is a complete accident that he chose that moment to leave – here it is a coincidence that the bull's arrival at t(1) preceded the trespasser's departure at t(2), so one who thinks it no accident that the trespasser left at t(2) can't cite the bull's entry as his reason.

Philosophers have found the causal relation deeply perplexing. To say that the bull's entry caused the trespasser's exit appears to commit one to a sui generis relation connecting the earlier event and the later one, the existence of which enables the bull's arrival to explain the trespasser's departure. But what is this relation? How do we come to know of its existence? Surely all we actually witness is the bull's arrival preceding the man's departure, but the bull may arrive and then the trespasser may depart without the one event causing the other. So what more is there to causation? Re-telling the bull story in terms of the notion of coincidence does not appear to help here.