Introduction

Summary

In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, there were widespread predictions among Chinese and foreign observers alike that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would collapse within a short period. The harsh repression of student-led dissent, not just in Beijing, which was what most of the world watched, but throughout the major cities of China, could not succeed for long, it was thought. The democratic movement was too strong, public disgust with the corruption and authoritarian policies of the government too great, and the world tide against communist governments – exemplified by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe later that same year – too profound for China to resist for long. When it was announced that Jiang Zemin, the Party secretary of Shanghai, had been made general secretary of the CCP, it was widely assumed that he would be a transitional figure, not unlike Hua Guofeng, who had served briefly as chairman of the Party following Mao Zedong's death in 1976.

It was also widely thought that if, through the exertion of pure brute strength, the communist government was able to reassert itself against the societal forces that had been arrayed against it, that the cost would be economic reform and growth. Indeed, such predictions seemed to be borne out as the pace of reform stalled and as administrative measures against inflation bit deeply into China's growth rates.