Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-lnqnp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T19:57:23.822Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Judicial (Dis)Empowerment and Centralisation Efforts

Institutional Impacts of China’s New Supervision Commissions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2021

Björn Ahl
Affiliation:
University of Cologne
Get access

Summary

After a brief introduction to the concept of judicial (dis-)empowerment and its application in an authoritarian context, the chapter compares the main actors in and procedures of corruption investigation pre- and post-reform to pinpoint the exact legal and structural changes brought about by the reform. It discusses how the newly established supervision commissions have changed the roles of the procuratorate and courts in criminal procedures against corruption, as well as their powers vis-à-vis investigators and party and executive organs at the same level. The chapter then examines the institutional embeddedness of the supervision commissions within the broader structure of the party-state’s dual system and central–local relations, before challenging the extant research that comprehends the new anti-corruption mechanism as a successful centralisation measure of the Communist Party of China. Its ultimate argument is that by legally transferring the jurisdiction of criminal investigations of corruption from the procuratorates to the supervision commissions, and consequently to the Commission for Discipline Inspection, the reform has substantially weakened the judiciary’s power vis-à-vis local party committees and other state institutions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Chinese Courts and Criminal Procedure
Post-2013 Reforms
, pp. 109 - 143
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×