Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches to Beliefs
- Models of Optimal Beliefs
- Chapter 5 How and Why Does Schematic Knowledge Affect Memory?
- Chapter 6 Probability, Belief, and the Richness of Cognition
- Implicit vs Explicit Beliefs
- Evolutionary Psychology of Beliefs
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Index
- References
Chapter 6 - Probability, Belief, and the Richness of Cognition
from Models of Optimal Beliefs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2022
Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Philosophical and Linguistic Approaches to Beliefs
- Models of Optimal Beliefs
- Chapter 5 How and Why Does Schematic Knowledge Affect Memory?
- Chapter 6 Probability, Belief, and the Richness of Cognition
- Implicit vs Explicit Beliefs
- Evolutionary Psychology of Beliefs
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Index
- References
Summary
Belief is often formalized using tools of probability theory. However, probability theory often focuses on simple examples – like coin flips or basic parametric distributions – and these do not describe much about actual human thinking. I highlight some basic examples of the complexity and richness of human mental representations and review some work which attempts to marry plausible types of representations with probabilistic models of belief, one of the most exciting current directions in psychology and machine learning.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cognitive Science of BeliefA Multidisciplinary Approach, pp. 135 - 150Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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