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Chapter 15 - Thoughts and Players: An Introduction to Old and New Economic Perspectives on Beliefs

from Economics and Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 November 2022

By
Andras Molnar  and
George Loewenstein
Edited by
Julien Musolino ,
Joseph Sommer  and
Pernille Hemmer
Julien Musolino
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Joseph Sommer
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Pernille Hemmer
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
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Summary

In this chapter we summarize how economists conceptualize beliefs. Moving both backward and forward in time, we review the way that mainstream economics currently deals with beliefs, as well as, briefly, the history of economists’ thinking about beliefs. Most importantly, we introduce the reader to a recent, transformational movement in economics that focuses on belief-based utility. This approach challenges the standard economic assumption that beliefs are only an input to decision making and examines implications of the intuitive idea that people derive pleasure and pain directly from their beliefs. We also address the question of when and why people care about what other people believe. We close with a discussion of the implications of these insights for contemporary social issues such as political polarization and fake news.

Keywords

anticipatory emotionsbelief-based utilitycognitive dissonancefalse beliefshomophilymotivated reasoningpolarizationself-esteemtheory of mind
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cognitive Science of Belief
A Multidisciplinary Approach
 , pp. 321 - 350
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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