Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and Theory
- Part II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas
- Part III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix I Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability
- Appendix II Measuring Leverage
- Appendix III Measuring Linkage
- Appendix IV Measuring Organizational Power
- References
- Index
Part III - The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and Theory
- Part II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas
- Part III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix I Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability
- Appendix II Measuring Leverage
- Appendix III Measuring Linkage
- Appendix IV Measuring Organizational Power
- References
- Index
Summary
In the cases examined in Chapter 3 (Eastern Europe) and Chapter 4 (the Americas), extensive linkage generated strong external pressure for democratization in the post–Cold War era. As a result, even powerful autocrats fell and nearly all competitive authoritarian regimes democratized. The remaining chapters of the book focus on regions that were characterized by lower linkage (the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia). With the exception of Taiwan, countries in these regions had weaker social, economic, technocratic, and intergovernmental ties to the United States and Western Europe. As a result, external democratizing pressure was weaker and more uneven. Because most of these lower-linkage cases lacked a strong domestic push for democracy, the vast majority (18 of 22) remained nondemocratic through 2008. These cases differed, however, in terms of authoritarian stability: In several cases, authoritarian incumbents or their chosen successors survived in power through 2008; in many other cases, leaders fell from power and were replaced by new autocrats. This variation is largely explained by differences in leverage and domestic organizational power. Where state and party structures were strong, and/or where Western leverage was medium or low, autocrats were able to hold onto power even in the face of highly mobilized opposition. By contrast, where organizational power was low and leverage was high, incumbents were often unable to thwart even modest opposition challenges. In such cases, authoritarian incumbents routinely fell from power – often two (e.g., Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) or more (e.g., Benin and Madagascar) times.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Competitive AuthoritarianismHybrid Regimes after the Cold War, pp. 181 - 182Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
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