References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Counting the ManyThe Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule, pp. 217 - 230Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013
References
. 1991. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
1998. We the People: Transformations. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
1999. The Force of Freedom: Rousseau on Forcing to Be Free. Political Theory 27 (3): 299–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2000. The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
1988. Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V. University of Chicago Law Review 55 (4): 1043–1104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995b. Rhetoric. Translated by . Edited by . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
1996. The Constitution of Athens. In The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 209–263.Google Scholar
. 1993. Democratic Rights at National and Workplace Levels. In The Idea of Democracy, edited by , , and . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 2008. The Constitution of a Federal Commonwealth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
and . 1996. Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review 90 (1): 34–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1999. Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1997. The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super Majority Rules. Journal of Economic Theory 75:237–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1968. Alexander III and the Twelfth Century: The Popes through History. New York: Newman Press.Google Scholar
2000. Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures. The American Political Science Review 94 (3):677–681.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review 83 (December):1181–1206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1996. Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy. In Democracy and Difference, edited by . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 67–94.Google Scholar
1968. The Bishop-Elect: A Study in Medieval Ecclesiastical Office. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1997. Politics or Principle?: Filibustering in the United States Senate. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
and . 1993. Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1990. Unveiling the Vote. British Journal of Political Science 20:311–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, ed. 1988. The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350–c. 1450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
1985. Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence 1502–1519. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
. 1996. The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
. 1928. On the Republic and on the Laws. Translated by . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
and . 1998. 64%-Majority Rule in Ducal Venice: Voting for the Doge. Public Choice 97:709–723.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1998. Electing Popes: Approval Balloting and Qualified-Majority Rule. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29 (1):1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1785. Essai sur l’Application de l’Analyse à la Probabilité des Décisions Rendues à la Pluralité des Voix. Paris: Imprimerie Royale.Google Scholar
1968. Oeuvres: Nouvelle impression en facsimilé de l’édition Paris 1847–1849. Edited by . 12 vols. Stuttgart- BadCannstatt: FriedrichFrommann.Google Scholar
1996. Contending Interpretations of Bentham’s Utilitarianism. Canadian Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 751–777.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2003. Democratic Equality: Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism. In The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 241–276.Google Scholar
and . 2008. On the Robustness of Majority Rule. Journal of the European Economic Association 6:949–973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1988. Classical Probability in the Enlightenment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
1982. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics.Google Scholar
. 1996. Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
2002. Democracy and Disagreement: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Law and Disagreement. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 6 (1):35–47.Google Scholar
, , and . 2009. The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2007. The Night of August 4, 1789: A Study of Social Interaction in Collective Decision-Making. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 45:71–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2009. Alexis de Tocqueville, The First Social Scientist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2008. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
, , , and . 1989. Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and Rousseau Revisited. American Political Science Review 83 (4):1317–1340.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, ed. 1966. Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Revised ed. 3 vols. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
. 1997. The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions. Law and Social Inquiry 22:501–531.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1965. Latran I, II, III et Latran IV, Histoire de conciles oecuméniques VI. Paris: Editions del’Orante.Google Scholar
. 1960. Unanimité et majorité (Observations sur quelques études récentes). In Études historiques à la memoire de Noël Didier. Paris: Montchrestien.Google Scholar
. 1929. The Greek City and Its Institutions. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., Ltd.Google Scholar
. 1979. Consistent Majority Rule over Compact Sets of Alternatives. Econometrica 47 (3):627–636.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1988. Rousseau’s General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective. American Political Science Review 82 (2):567–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1996. Buying Supermajorities. American Political Science Review 90 (2):303–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, and 2000. Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions. The American Political Science Review 94 (3):683–684.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1994. Dialogue on the Government of Florence. Translated and edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1995. The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
. 1996. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Democracy. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.Google Scholar
. 1965. Das Wahlrecht der Benediktusregula. Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 76:233–245.Google Scholar
1999. Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and . 1997. The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States. William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law 3 (1):113–136.Google Scholar
. 1967. Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises. Harvard Law Review 80: 986–1003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1997. The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria. Oxford: Clarendon University Press.Google Scholar
1946. Laudes Regiae: A Study in Liturgical Acclamations and Mediaeval Ruler Worship (University of California Publications in History, xxxiii). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.Google Scholar
. 1965. John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.Google Scholar
. 1986. Parliamentary Selection: Social and Political Choice in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1992. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1994. Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy. Political Theory 22 (2): 277–296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 2011. The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences of Pragmatism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
. 1930. Le Liberum Veto: etude sur le development du principe majoritaire. Paris: Librarie Ancienne Honore Champion.Google Scholar
, , and . 2011. Public Opinion and Gay Rights: Do Members of Congress Follow Their Constituents’ Preferences. Typescript.
1997. Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? Hoi Periestekotes and the Athenian Lawcourts. Journal of Hellenic Studies 117:183–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2006. Law and Justice in the Courts of Classical Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1814. Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. 14 vols. Vol. 7, Oeuvres completes. Paris: Académie des Sciences.Google Scholar
1949. The Origin and Significance of the Counting of Votes. Classical Philology 44 (3):144–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 2009. Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness. American Political Science Review 103 (3):367–386.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1951. Preface to the Universal Science. In Leibniz Selections, edited by . New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.Google Scholar
. 1995. Responding to Imperfection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1975. Sanius Consilium: Recent Work on the Election of the Abbot in the Rule of St. Benedict. The American Benedictine Review 26 (1): 1–15.Google Scholar
. 1992. Judicial reform and law reform in the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 2004. On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55:521–544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1988. Two Treatises of Government. Edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1994. Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment. American Political Science Review 88:355–370.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2010. Against Majoritarianism: Democratic Values and Institutional Design. Boston Law Review 90 (2):1029–1042.Google Scholar
. 1987. On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation. Political Theory 15 (3):338–368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, et al. 2010. The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1):64–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1998. On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford World Classics.
1987. Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy. Leiden: E. J. Brill.Google Scholar
. 1992. Spirit of the Laws. Translated by , , and . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1991. The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050 to 1250. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1958. Sanior et maior pars. Note sur l’evolution des techniques électorales dans les orders religieux du VIe au XIIIe siècles. Revue historique de droit française et étranger 4th series (36):368–397 and 491–529.Google Scholar
1982. Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics 1280–1400. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.Google Scholar
2009. Lineages of European Political Thought. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press.Google Scholar
2010. Decision Rules, Social Norms and the Expression of Disagreement: The Case of Qualified-Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union. Social Science Information 49: 83–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1989. Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2005. Athenian Legacies: Essays on the Politics of Going Together. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
2008. Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. Constitutional Stability. Constitutional Political Economy 3 (2):137–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2005. The Defender of the Peace. Translated by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1918. Description of Greece. Translated by and . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 1999. Decision-Making in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2008. Canon Law, Careers and Conquest: Episcopal Elections in Normandy and Greater Anjou, c. 1140–c. 1230. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1996. Protagoras. Translated by C. C. W. Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 1950. A Roman Legal Theory of Consent, Quod Omnes Tangit, in Medieval Representation. Wisconsin Law Review (January): 66–78.Google Scholar
1964. Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100–1322. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2010. Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2005. Rousseau on the People as Legislative Gate-Keepers, Not Framers. American Political Science Review 99 (1):145–151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1988. Community, Counsel, and Representation. In Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 520–572.Google Scholar
, , and . 2007. Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1969. Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice. American Political Science Review 63 (1): 40–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1975. The Limits of Consensual Decision. American Political Science Review 69:1270–1294.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2011. Veto Points, Qualified Majorities, and Agenda-Setting Rules in Constitutional Amendment Procedures. In 2nd International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice. Oslo, Norway.Google Scholar
and . 2006. Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability. In Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Design, edited by . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 319–342.Google Scholar
2008. Communicative Rationality in the Citizens’ Assembly and Referendum Processes. In Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, edited by Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
2009. Majority Rule versus Consensus: The Political Thought of John C. Calhoun. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.Google Scholar
. 2004. Arguing for Majority Rule. Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):41–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1990. Papacy 1073–1198: Continuity and Innovation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2004. The Institutions of the Church, 1073–c.1198. In Cambridge Histories Online, ed. and . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (accessed August 20, 2010).Google Scholar
, ed. 1961. The Federalist Papers. New York: Penguin Books.
. 1997. The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1997. The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 to 1494). 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
1925. Il principio maggioritario nella storia del Diritto Canonico. Archivio Giuridico Filippo Serafini IX.Google Scholar
1998. What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us about How Juries (Should) Make Decisions. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 6:1–53.Google Scholar
. 2004. Legality and Legitimacy. Translated by . Durham, NC: Duke University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2008. Constitutional Theory. Translated by . Durham, NC: Duke University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1983. Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court – A Judicial Biography. New York: New York University Press.Google Scholar
and . 2000. And So Say Some of Us … What to Do When Jurors Disagree. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 9:445–447.Google Scholar
2008. Voting the General Will: Rousseau on Decision Rules. Political Theory 36 (3):403–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2005. Rousseau’s Anti-Agenda-Setting Agenda and Contemporary Democratic Theory. American Political Science Review 99 (1):137–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2001. Counsel and Consent in Fifteenth Century Genoa. English Historical Review 116 (468):834–862.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1982. The Lex Repetundarum and the Political Ideas of Gaius Gracchus. Journal of Roman Studies 72:18–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2011. Vagueness in Quantity: Two Cases from a Linguistic Perspective. In Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, edited by , , and . London: College Publications, 5–23.Google Scholar
1985. Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment. Washington, DC: Brookings.Google Scholar
. 2001. Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
2002. The Law of Group Polarization. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2): 175–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, ed. 1990. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 1. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
. 2001. Hierarchie und Autonomie. Regelungstraditionen der Bischofsbestellung in der Geschichte der kirschlichen Walhrechts bis 1140 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.
2008. Who Should Govern Who Governs? The Role of Citizens in Reforming the Electoral System. In Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, edited by . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press20–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2000. Democracy in America. Translated by . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2004. Condorcet’s Democratic Theory of Representative Government. European Journal of Political Theory 3 (1):53–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2006. Representative Democracy: Principles and Geneaology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1990. Pebbles, Points, or Ballots: The Emergence of the Individual Vote in Rome. Arctos 24:161–177.Google Scholar
. 2007. Mechanisms of Democracy: Institutional Design Writ Small. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 2000. Treatise on Tolerance and Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
. 1995. The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle’s Politics. Political Theory 23:563–584.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2002. God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and , ed. 2008. Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
and . 2009. A Jury of One: Opinion Formation, Conformity, and Dissent on Juries. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 6 (3): 513–540.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and . 2006. Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
. 2005. Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability in America’s First Century. Working paper.
. 1986. Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XLVII (1):111–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2008. The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
1998. Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
. 2000. The Making of Gratian’s Decretum. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar