Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T05:31:19.921Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The Death of Constituent Power

from Part I - Foundations, Theory, and Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2024

Ran Hirschl
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Yaniv Roznai
Affiliation:
Reichman University, Israel
Get access

Summary

Constitutional theory in democratic countries has traditionally postulated the existence of a sovereign people endowed with the authority to enact a constitution. An influential view going back to Sieyès claims that the constituent power of the people is legally unlimited. The ability of the people to enact a constitution is supposed to be fully disconnected from positive law. This notion, however, is seriously flawed. The idea that a legally omnipotent people, working its will at the constitutional stage, is the fountain of positive law makes no sense. Although the idea can be used rhetorically in some justificatory contexts to support valuable institutional arrangements, it also raises a number of pragmatic concerns. All things considered, our theoretical and political discussions would be more fruitful if we certified the death of that concept.

Type
Chapter
Information
Deciphering the Genome of Constitutionalism
The Foundations and Future of Constitutional Identity
, pp. 63 - 75
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ackerman, Bruce. 1991. We the People: Foundations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Albert, Richard. 2019. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arato, Andrew. 2016. Post Sovereign Constitution Making: Learning and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barak, Aharon. 2015. Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bredin, Jean-Denis. 1988. Sieyès: La clé de la Révolution française. Paris: Éditions de Fallois.Google Scholar
Carré de Malberg, Raymond. 2004. Contribution à la Théorie Générale de l’État. Paris: Dalloz.Google Scholar
Colón-Ríos, Joel. 2020. Constituent Power and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferreres Comella, Victor. 2009. Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James. 2000. The Federalist. New York: The Modern Library.Google Scholar
Hart, H.L.A. 1961. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Herzog, Don. 2020. Sovereignty, RIP. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey. 2010. Constitutional Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Jacobsohn, Gary Jeffrey, and Roznai, Yaniv. 2020. Constitutional Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Levinson, Sanford. 2015. An Argument Open to All: Reading the Federalist in the 21st 111 Century. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1968. The Social Contract. London: Penguin.Google Scholar
Roznai, Yaniv. 2017. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Roznai, Yaniv. 2021. “The Boundaries of Constituent Authority.” Connecticut Law Review 53 (5): 13811408.Google Scholar
Schmitt, Carl. 2005. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sieyès. 2003. Political Writings. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Verdugo, Sergio. 2023. “Is It Time to Abandon the Theory of Constituent Power?I.CON, International Journal of Constitutional Law 21 (1): 1479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×