9 - Assuming irrational actors: the Powell amendment

Summary

Introduction

Riker's first spectacular example is the 1956 school-construction bill in the US House of Representatives. A bill to fund school construction was amended to forbid segregation of white and black students in areas receiving aid. The amended bill failed. Riker offers two versions of this story; Krehbiel and Rivers (1990) a third; my running commentary challenges Riker's interpretations and adds more flesh to the bones of the Krehbiel and Rivers model. The majority that wanted school aid was thwarted by the desegregation amendment, according to Riker. Riker's first version argues alternatively that there was a natural cycle or that there was strategic voting by opponents of school aid that defeated the majority and hence is an instance of harmful manipulation. The second version drops the natural-cycle claim, revises the strategic-voting claim, and presents revised estimates of the distribution of preferences in the chamber. Since strategic voting can be countered by strategic voting the question arises as to why those who favored both school aid and desegregation failed to vote strategically against the desegregation amendment in order to retain school aid. Riker's answer in his second version is that these legislators were constrained by the irrational preferences of their constituents.

The same issues came to a vote in 1957, however, and the same legislators who failed to vote strategically against the desegregation amendment in 1956 did vote strategically against the desegregation amendment in 1957, which destroys Riker's second interpretation.