Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Glossary
- 1 The decline of Indonesian Democracy
- Part 1 Historic al and Comparative Perspectives
- Part 2 Polarisation and Populism
- Part 3 Popular Supp ort for Democracy
- Part 4 Democratic Institutions
- Part 5 Law, Security and Disorder
- Index
- Indonesia Update Series
15 - In the state’s stead? Vigilantism and policing of religious offence in Indonesia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2020
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables and Figures
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Glossary
- 1 The decline of Indonesian Democracy
- Part 1 Historic al and Comparative Perspectives
- Part 2 Polarisation and Populism
- Part 3 Popular Supp ort for Democracy
- Part 4 Democratic Institutions
- Part 5 Law, Security and Disorder
- Index
- Indonesia Update Series
Summary
It was an awkward encounter. Deputy National Police Chief Nanan Soekarna shifted in his seat as the popular talk-show host Najwa Shihab tried to extract a promise from Muhammad Al Khaththath, the secretarygeneral of the Forum of the Islamic Community (Forum Umat Islam, FUI), that his organisation would no longer conduct vigilante raids on food stalls in the upcoming fasting month. Al Khaththath remained defiant. ‘Raids are only conducted when citizens complain to us. If there is no response from the police [to stop the sale of food when Muslims are fasting], Islamic mass organisations [ormas] will be forced to act in their place’, he asserted. When reminded of the newly passed ormas law, which prohibits such raids, he lamented the limited law enforcement capacity of the police and insisted that citizens had the right to punish wrongdoers: ‘Just think about it, even when we catch a thief, don't we beat him up?’
Unlike National Police Chief Timur Pradopo, who was known to be close to hardline Islamist organisations and frequently expressed his gratitude for their support in maintaining public order (Tempo 2010), Soekarna had a rocky relationship with these groups. Just a few days earlier, he had issued a stern warning to the ormas: ‘Unofficial raids are prohibited, and it is our duty to take action against anyone involved in anarchic activities’ (Arnaz 2013).
That evening, however, Soekarna appeared more conciliatory. There was no mention of dire consequences, only gentle attempts to guide vigilantes’ demands through the proper channels. He calmly explained that enforcing the law was the job of the police, and if officers were not responsive to citizens’ complaints, they could be fired: ‘With a policy of swiftly firing non-responsive police officers, the ormas really can trust us to get the job done’. This appeal for trust prompted even more indignation from Al Khaththath, who berated the police for not paying attention to issues that offended Muslim sensibilities. ‘There would be no need for [our] raids if the police took preventative action’, he claimed. ‘That is why [we] are now pushing the police to conduct the raids.’ On this point, the two men found common ground. Soekarna agreed that the vigilante organisations should work through the police, rather than in their stead.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Democracy in IndonesiaFrom Stagnation to Regression?, pp. 303 - 325Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2020