4 - Economising on virtue

Summary

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.

(Federalist papers, 57, James Madison)

Motivation and morality

In the two preceding chapters we have advanced a general model of human motivation that incorporates a desire to act morally alongside other desires, where that desire may operate either as a direct determinant of action or as a ground for the adoption of a moral disposition. We wish, in this chapter, to push the argument forward on three distinct fronts.

Our first concern will be with the idea of economising on virtue – the idea that institutions should be designed in such a way that they do not rely on the virtue of the individuals who act under them, so that the emergence of satisfactory results arises not only through the virtue of individuals but also is supported by the force of other motives, including self-interest specifically. This idea is an old one, dating at least from St Augustine's discussion of private property as a remedium peccatorum (guard against sin) – though, as is well-known, it receives its most extensive development and application in the work of Adam Smith, David Hume, Montesquieu and the American authors of the Federalist papers.