7 - Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Luck

Summary

I argued in the last chapter that Modest Meleian Libertarianism, despite its provision of dual control, is inhospitable to deontic anchors. In this chapter, I explore whether a more robust variety of libertarianism holds better promise for accommodating deontic morality.

I defend the cogency of the objection that, if this sort of libertarianism is true, our choices and actions are a matter of luck undermining responsibility, in these steps: First, I propose a necessary condition of responsibility. In broad strokes and with qualifications to be noted, this is the condition that an agent is responsible for a choice only if there is an explanation (that need not be deterministic) in terms of prior reasons of why the agent made that choice rather than some other. Second, I provide a rationale for this condition that appeals centrally to aspects of the concepts of blameworthiness and responsibility in general. In particular, the rationale exploits the view that ascriptions of responsibility disclose what an agent morally stands for in relation to deeds for which she is responsible; responsibility requires a sort of “self-expression.”

If the luck objection does seriously threaten responsibility, then it seems that it should threaten deontic morality as well. If no agent can, for instance, be blameworthy for an action that is a result of luck, then equally, it would seem, no agent can, for example, do moral wrong by performing an action that is the outcome of luck.