Book contents
- Dominance Through Division
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Dominance Through Division
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Enduring Success of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
- 3 A Theory of Group-Based Clientelism
- 4 Second Prize Is a Set of Steak Knives
- 5 Perfect Storm Conditions for Tournaments in Japan
- 6 How Politicians Tie Money to Electoral Support
- 7 Which Electoral Districts Get More Money
- 8 How Tournaments Impact Decisions to Vote
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A
- References
- Index
9 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2025
Book contents
- Dominance Through Division
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Dominance Through Division
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Enduring Success of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
- 3 A Theory of Group-Based Clientelism
- 4 Second Prize Is a Set of Steak Knives
- 5 Perfect Storm Conditions for Tournaments in Japan
- 6 How Politicians Tie Money to Electoral Support
- 7 Which Electoral Districts Get More Money
- 8 How Tournaments Impact Decisions to Vote
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter provides a short summary of the book’s contributions to comparative politics, political economy, and Japanese politics. Then, it sketches out a range of questions pertaining to different genres of research in political science, which future scholarship should address.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Dominance Through DivisionGroup-Based Clientelism in Japan, pp. 311 - 320Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025