Book contents
- Dominance Through Division
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Dominance Through Division
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Enduring Success of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
- 3 A Theory of Group-Based Clientelism
- 4 Second Prize Is a Set of Steak Knives
- 5 Perfect Storm Conditions for Tournaments in Japan
- 6 How Politicians Tie Money to Electoral Support
- 7 Which Electoral Districts Get More Money
- 8 How Tournaments Impact Decisions to Vote
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A
- References
- Index
8 - How Tournaments Impact Decisions to Vote
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2025
- Dominance Through Division
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Dominance Through Division
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Enduring Success of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
- 3 A Theory of Group-Based Clientelism
- 4 Second Prize Is a Set of Steak Knives
- 5 Perfect Storm Conditions for Tournaments in Japan
- 6 How Politicians Tie Money to Electoral Support
- 7 Which Electoral Districts Get More Money
- 8 How Tournaments Impact Decisions to Vote
- 9 Conclusion
- Appendix A
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 8 looks for evidence of tournaments in the decisions of voters in Japan to turn out and vote in Lower House elections, 1980–2014. Under a tournament, decisions to vote are expected to hinge on where in the ranking a given municipality is expected to end up. All else equal, it expects that voters will be systematically more likely to go to the polls when they live in municipalities that are projected to place highly. Moreover, among municipalities projected to place highly, projections of further increases in rank are expected to bring about an even larger impact on turnout. The chapter presents three sets of empirical tests of these two hypotheses. The first two look within electoral districts and examine how turnout varies as a function of where municipalities are expected to place in the ranking. The third set of tests leverage variation in competitiveness across electoral districts, which we know impacts turnout, and variation in competitiveness and ruralness, which we know impacts turnout in Japan. The tests reveal support for both hypotheses and shed new light on determinants of political participation across time and space.
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- Dominance Through DivisionGroup-Based Clientelism in Japan, pp. 272 - 310Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025