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Chapter 9 - Management of Transboundary Waters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2021

Ariel Dinar  and
Yacov Tsur
Ariel Dinar
Affiliation:
University of California, Riverside
Yacov Tsur
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Summary

The chapter surveys the literature and approaches that deal with the economics and politics of managing internationally shared water resources (aka transboundary water). Principles that are relevant to the analysis of management of shared international water are discussed and demonstrated. One aspect that is unique to international water is the use of agreements between all or part of the riparian states that share the basin. The chapter introduces several means by which cooperation among the riparian states is defined and calculated, using the information embedded in the treaties that they signed. The chapter provides also an example, applied to the case of the Blue Nile Basin, of the effect of using certain allocation methods on the welfare of the river basin riparian states, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, and its effects on the stability of their allocation agreement.

Keywords

EthiopiaSudanEgyptBlue Niletransboundary wateragreementswater allocationbasin-wide welfareCore
Type
Chapter
Information
The Economics of Water Resources
A Comprehensive Approach
 , pp. 190 - 206
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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