Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Three classical theories of emotion: the feeling, behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories
- 2 A fourth classical theory: the cognitive theory
- 3 The causal–evaluative theory of emotions
- 4 The cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion
- 5 The appetitive aspect of the emotions
- 6 The objects of emotions
- 7 Physiological changes and the emotions
- 8 Emotions and feelings
- 9 Emotions and behaviour
- 10 Emotion statements
- 11 Emotions and motives
- 12 Emotions and purpose
- 13 Blaming the emotions
- 14 Looking back: a summary
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Emotion statements
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Three classical theories of emotion: the feeling, behaviourist and psychoanalytic theories
- 2 A fourth classical theory: the cognitive theory
- 3 The causal–evaluative theory of emotions
- 4 The cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion
- 5 The appetitive aspect of the emotions
- 6 The objects of emotions
- 7 Physiological changes and the emotions
- 8 Emotions and feelings
- 9 Emotions and behaviour
- 10 Emotion statements
- 11 Emotions and motives
- 12 Emotions and purpose
- 13 Blaming the emotions
- 14 Looking back: a summary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter is a brief survey of the ways in which emotion statements are used, for some of these ways have either gone unrecognised or have been overemphasised to the exclusion of others. It is really an addendum to the previous chapter, as at least one sort of emotion statement could be said to amount to emotional behaviour.
Bedford has argued that emotion statements do not describe but interpret behaviour (Bedford, 1956–57, p. 288). Cassin, while accepting that this is a plausible view of third person statements about emotions, considers that it is not very plausible in the context of first-person emotion statements (Cassin, 1968, pp. 564–5). O. H. Green seems to hold the view that statements such as ‘I am angry’ are always reports (Green, 1970, Section 111, pp. 562–5). I think that none of these philosophers has told the whole story. Rather, I shall make out the case that,
(1) Statements of emotions may report emotions;
(2) They may interpret them;
(3) They may express them in such a way as to become part of the emotional behaviour itself;
(4) Finally, there are uses which are parasitic on the interpretative.
The first person statement as report, interpretation and expression
The statement ‘I love you’, referring to emotional love can, first of all, tell you, or report, that I am now undergoing, or have undergone in the past, and am likely to undergo in the future, the emotion love in regard to you.
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- Emotion , pp. 156 - 161Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1980