Local Property Rights to the Commons

Terry L. Anderson; Gary D. Libecap

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511845734.005

4 - Local Property Rights to the Commons

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2014

Terry L. Anderson and

Gary D. Libecap

Show author details

Terry L. Anderson: Affiliation:
Property and Environment Research Center
Gary D. Libecap: Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara

Book contents

Get access

Summary

We have emphasized the losses of open access attributable to individual efforts to capture resource rents in the absence of property rights. Although it is rational for individuals to ignore their effect on the overall value of an open-access resource, it can also make sense for individuals to act collectively to constrain their actions to protect and increase rents. The common solution proposed by economists is either private property rights that limit access or governmental regulation.

Another solution that has received more recent attention is a blend of informal property rights and local collective action known as common property resource management or CPRM. Common property resource management limits entry to individuals who are members of the group and excludes outsiders. CPRM generally works best if there are internal governance structures to link individual actions with group goals and if the state recognizes and enforces common property resource organizations and boundaries. Examples of CPRM include local grazing associations, fishing cooperatives, mutual irrigation companies, and groundwater management cooperatives. Common property can reduce over-exploitation relative to open access, but competitive incentives remain within the group to varying degrees, depending on institutional design and group cohesion. Accordingly, it may still be less efficient than sole ownership or, in some cases, than regulation.

As with environmental markets based on private property rights, CPRM can allow trade, but it is more often informal, usually among group members and sometimes involving the approval of community leaders. Casual water exchanges among farmers within irrigation districts in the western U.S. are an example of common property trade. Farmers within irrigation districts often do not have clearly-defined individual rights to water when the district holds the water rights. However, they have customary use claims that allow an irrigator to acquire additional water during a growing season from other irrigators on an informal basis.

Type: Chapter
Information: Environmental Markets
A Property Rights Approach
, pp. 92 - 112

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511845734.005 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2014

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Schlager, Edella and Blomquist, William (2008), Embracing Watershed Politics, Boulder: University of Colorado PressCrossRef Google Scholar

Chong, Howard and Sunding, David (2006), “Water Markets and Trading,” Annual Review of Environmental Resources 31: 11.1–11.26CrossRef Google Scholar

Howitt, Richard and Hansen, Kristiana (2005), “The Evolving Western Water Markets,” Choices 20(1): 59–64Google Scholar

Ostrom, Elinor (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, 173–176CrossRef Google Scholar

Dixit, Avinash K. (2004), Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 138–143Google Scholar

Fitzpatrick, Daniel (2006), “Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access,” The Yale Law Journal 115: 996–1048CrossRef Google Scholar

Baland, Jean-Marie and Platteau, Jean-Philippe (1996), Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities? Rome and New York: FAO and Oxford University Press, 47.Google Scholar

Peltzman, Sam (1976), “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics 19(2): 211–240CrossRef Google Scholar

Becker, Gary S. (1983), “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(3): 371–400CrossRef Google Scholar

Krueger, Anne O. (1974), “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64(3): 291–303Google Scholar

Tullock, Gordon (1967), “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft,” Western Economic Journal 5(3): 224–232Google Scholar

Acheson, James M. (2003), Capturing the Commons: Devising Institutions to Manage the Main Lobster Industry, Lebanon, NH: University Press of New EnglandGoogle Scholar

Newman, Peter, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and The Law, New York: Macmillan, Vol. 3: 424–432

Ostrom, Elinor (2000), “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(3): 137–158CrossRef Google Scholar

Ostrom, Elinor (2011), “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems,” American Economic Review 100(3): 641–672CrossRef Google Scholar

Baland, and Platteau, (1996, 286–90)

Johnson, Ronald N. and Libecap, Gary D. (1980), “Legislating Commons: The Navajo Tribal Council and the Navajo Range,” Economic Enquiry 18(1): 69–92Google Scholar

Olson, Mancur (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard University PressGoogle Scholar

Agrawal, Arun and Goyal, Sangeev (2001), “Group Size and Collective Action: Third Party Monitoring in Common Pool Resources,” Comparative Political Studies 34(1): 63–93CrossRef Google Scholar

Gutiérrez, Nicolás L., Hilborn, Ray, and Defeo, Omar (2011), “Leadership, Social Capital and Incentives Promote Successful Fisheries,” Nature February 17, 470: 386–389CrossRef

Libecap, Gary D., 2000, “The Effect of Cost Heterogeneity in the Success and Failure of the New Deal's Agricultural and Industrial Programs,” in Explorations in Economic History 37, 370–400Google Scholar

Osborne, D.K., 1976, “Cartel Problems,” American Economic Review 66(5): 835–844Google Scholar

Fog, Bjark 1956, “How are Cartel Prices Determined?” Journal of Industrial Economics 5: 16–23CrossRef Google Scholar

Johnson, Ronald N. and Libecap, Gary D. (1982), “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery,” American Economic Review 72(5): 1005–1022Google Scholar

Deacon, Robert T., Parker, Dominic P., and Costello, Christopher (2013), “Reforming Fisheries: Lesson from a Self-Selected Cooperative,” Journal of Law and Economics 56(1): 83–125CrossRef Google Scholar

Grief, Aver (1993), “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” American Economic Review 83(3): 525–548Google Scholar

Ogilvie, Sheilagh (2011), Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds 1000–1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University PressCrossRef Google Scholar

Greif, Avner, Milgrom, Paul, and Weingast, Barry R. (1994), “Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild,” The Journal of Political Economy 102(4): 745–776CrossRef Google Scholar

Adhikari, B., and Lovett, J. C. (2006), “Institutions and Collective Action: Does Heterogeneity Matter in Community-Based Resource Management?” Journal of Development Studies, 42(3), 426–445CrossRef Google Scholar

Frost, P., Campbell, B., Luckert, M., Mutamba, M., Mandondo, A., and Kozanayi, W. (2007), “In Search of Improved Rural Livelihoods in Semi-Arid Regions through Local Management of Natural Resources: Lessons from Case Studies in Zimbabwe,” World Development 35(11): 1961–1974CrossRef Google Scholar

Johnson, J. (2000), “Determinants of Collective Action on the Local Commons: A Model with Evidence from Mexico,” Journal of Development Economics 62(1): 181–208CrossRef Google Scholar

Moran, Emilio F. and Ostrom, Elinor, eds. (2005), Seeing the Forest and the TreesCambridge: MIT PressGoogle Scholar

Burger, Joanna, Ostrom, Elinor, Norgaard, Richard B., Policansky, David, and Goldstein, Bernard D. eds. (2001), Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, Washington D.C.: Island Press

Ostrom, Elinor (1992), Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, San Francisco: ICS PressGoogle Scholar

Dennis, E., Ilyasov, J., Van Dusen, E., Treshkin, S., Lee, M., and Eyzaguirre, P., P. (2007), “Local Institutions and Plant Genetic Conservation: Exchange of Plant Genetic Resources in Rural Uzbekistan and Some Theoretical Implications,” World Development 35(9): 1564–1578CrossRef Google Scholar

Aggarwal, R. M. (2000), “Possibilities and Limitations to Cooperation in Small Groups: The Case of Group-Owned Wells in Southern India,” World Development 28(8): 1481–1497CrossRef Google Scholar

Tai, H. (2007), “Development through Conservation: An Institutional Analysis of Indigenous Community-Based Conservation in Taiwan,” World Development 35(7): 1186–1203CrossRef Google Scholar

Chermak, J.M. and Krause, K. (2002), “Individual Response, Information, and Intergenerational Common Pool Problems,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43(1): 47–70CrossRef Google Scholar

Platteau, J., J. and Seki, E., E. (2007), “Heterogeneity, Social Esteem and Feasibility of Collective Action,” Journal of Development Economics 83(2): 302–325CrossRef Google Scholar

Platteau, J. and Strzalecki, T. (2004), “Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-Evidence from Senegal,” Journal of African Economies 13(3): 417–445CrossRef Google Scholar

Ray, B. and Bhattacharya, R.N. (2011), “Transaction Costs, Collective Action and Survival of Heterogeneous Co-management Institutions: Case Study of Forest Management Organisations in West Bengal, India,” Journal of Development Studies 47(2): 253–273CrossRef Google Scholar

Ruttan, L. M. (2008), “Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective Action and Collective Goods Provisioning,” World Development 36(5): 969–985CrossRef Google Scholar

Varughese, G. and Ostrom, E., E. (2001), “The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal,” World Development, 29(5): 747–765CrossRef Google Scholar

Vedeld, T. (2000), “Village Politics: Heterogeneity, Leadership and Collective Action,” Journal of Development Studies 36(5): 105–134CrossRef Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. (2007), “The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons for Contemporary Environmental and Natural Resource Policy,” The Journal of Economic History 67(2): 257–291CrossRef Google Scholar

Umbeck, John (1977), “A Theory of Contact Choice and the California Gold Rush,” Journal of Law and Economics 20(2): 421–437CrossRef Google Scholar

Umbeck, John (1977), “The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights,” Explorations in Economic History 14: 197–226CrossRef Google Scholar

Umbeck, John (1981): “Might Makes Right: A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution of Property Rights,” Economic Inquiry 19(1): 38–59CrossRef Google Scholar

Stewart, James I. (2006), “Migration to the Agricultural Frontier and Wealth Accumulation, 1860–1870,” Explorations in Economic History 43: 547–577CrossRef Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. (1978), “Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case of Western Mineral Rights,” Journal of Economic History 38(2): 338–362CrossRef Google Scholar

Libecap, Gary D. (1979), “Government Support of Private Claims to Public Minerals: Western Mineral Rights,” Business History Review 53(3): 362–385CrossRef Google Scholar

Clay, Karen and Wright, Gavin (2005), “Order without Law? Property Rights During the California Gold Rush,” Explorations in Economic History 42: 155–183CrossRef Google Scholar

Hallagan, William (1978), “Share Contracting for California Gold,” Explorations in Economic History 15: 196–210CrossRef Google Scholar

Zerbe, Richard O. and Leigh Anderson, C. (2001), “Culture and Fairness in the Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields,” Journal of Economic History 61(1): 114–143CrossRef Google Scholar

Anderson, Terry and Hill, P.J. (1975), “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West,” Journal of Law and Economics 18(1): 177–198CrossRef Google Scholar

Anderson, Terry L. and Hill, P.J. (2004), The Not So Wild, Wild West: Property Rights on the Frontier, Palo Alto: Stanford University PressGoogle Scholar PubMed

Libecap, Gary D. (1981), Locking up the Range: Federal Land Controls and Grazing, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 16Google Scholar

Taylor Dennen, R. (1976), “Cattlemen's Associations and Property Rights in Land in the American West,” Explorations in Economic History 13: 423–436CrossRef Google Scholar

Staples Osgood, Ernest (1929), The Day of the Cattleman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 186 and Libecap (1981, 31–37)Google Scholar

Scott, Anthony (1955), “The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy 63(2): 116−24CrossRef Google Scholar

Christy, Jr. Francis T. (1982), Territorial Use Rights in Marine Fisheries: Definitions and Conditions, Rome: FAO fisheries Technical Paper 227Google Scholar

Uchida, H. and Wilen, James E. (2004), “Japanese Coastal Fisheries Management and Institutional Designs: A Descriptive Analysis,” in Matsuda, Y. and Yamamoto, T., eds., Proceedings of the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the International Institute for Fishery Economics and Trade, Corvallis, Oregon: International Institute for Fishery Economics and TradeGoogle Scholar

Townsend, R., Shotton, Ross, and Uchida, H. (2008), Case Studies in Fisheries Self-Governance, Rome: FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 504Google Scholar

Book contents

4 - Local Property Rights to the Commons

Summary

Access options

References

Save book to Kindle

Save book to Dropbox

Save book to Google Drive