3 - Grand Designs

Summary

Deepening of the Integration versus Enlargement

One of the most fascinating “either — or” questions in the history of the European Union has been the dispute, sometimes almost of a theological character, of whether to deepen the integration, saying No to enlargements, or open the door for new members, with the accompanying slowing down of the integration as a risk. As always the solution proved to be a compromise. Take in the applicants and maintain the pace of the integration as far as possible.

The issue came to the forefront for the first, but far from the last time, when then President Charles de Gaulle of France in January 1963 said No to the United Kingdom. The accession negotiations actually went very well, as five (all except France) of the original member states were prepared to grant concessions to Britain. France felt, however, that these concessions would change the fundamental structure and the balance between costs and benefits for member states achieved during the establishment of the European Union and the preceding negotiations from 1955 to 1958. The story goes that at a talk in 1944 between Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Charles de Gaulle as leader of the Free French, Churchill allegedly said that every time Britain had to choose between the overseas world (the United States and the Commonwealth) and Europe, it would choose the overseas world. This may explain why de Gaulle harboured strong suspicion about the British motives for wanting to join the European integration.

In this round, deepening of the integration won over enlargement. The decision to reject fundamental changes was taken by France. The other five more or less grudgingly acquiesced. It can be said, and a good many observers have said so, that France did not defend the basic structure of the European Union, but its own economic interests flowing from the Common Agricultural Policy. This is correct. In this context, however, it must not be overlooked that the benefits accruing to France from the Common Agricultural Policy were part of the political deal and cost-benefit distribution among member states negotiated prior to the signature of the Treaty of Rome. It had therefore become part of the fundamental system, and if the British demands had been complied with, they might have changed the fundamental structure and thereby also the distribution of cost-benefits.