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17 - Is It Possible to Formulate a Precise and Objective Standard of Proof?

Some Questions Based on an Argumentative Approach to Evidence

from Part V - Standards of Evidence As Decision-Making Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2022

By
Daniel González Lagier
Edited by
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán  and
Carmen Vázquez
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
Carmen Vázquez
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
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Summary

In this study, I adopt an argumentative perspective on evidence, focusing on three points: (1) The structure of evidentiary inference; (2) which reasons count as good ones for establishing the degree of corroboration of a hypothesis and (3) the possibility of formulating a precise, objective standard of proof.

Keywords

Legal Evidencelegal argumentationrules of reasoned judgmentstandard of proof
Type
Chapter
Information
Evidential Legal Reasoning
Crossing Civil Law and Common Law Traditions
 , pp. 375 - 394
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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References

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