Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T07:36:06.164Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

18 - Prolegomena to a Theory of Standards of Proof

The Test Case for State Liability for Undue Pre-trial Detention

from Part V - Standards of Evidence As Decision-Making Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2022

By
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Edited by
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán  and
Carmen Vázquez
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
Carmen Vázquez
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
Get access

Summary

If evidential legal reasoning is probabilistic, and rational certainty about a factual hypothesis is unattainable, then we need rules, called “standards of proof”, to determine the degree of probability required to be able to deem the assumption as proven. Only if we have standards of proof that indicate evidential thresholds will we be able to use other decision-making rules, such as burdens of proof or presumptions. Indeed, the purpose of burden of proof rules is to determine who loses the case if there is insufficient evidence of any of the hypotheses at issue. However, to apply these rules we need to know when the evidence is sufficient. The same is true of rebuttable presumptions, which require that a hypothesis be admitted in court (and used in the reasoning) in the absence of (sufficient) proof to the contrary. Therefore, for example, the presumption of innocence as a procedural rule means that defendants must be found innocent unless there is sufficient proof of their guilt. But when is the proof of a defendant’s guilt sufficient? Once again, implementing the presumption of innocence (like any other rebuttable presumption) presupposes the existence of a rule that establishes the evidentiary threshold.

Keywords

Standard of proofpresumption of innocencedecisions rulesevidentiary threshold
Type
Chapter
Information
Evidential Legal Reasoning
Crossing Civil Law and Common Law Traditions
 , pp. 395 - 426
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allen, R. J. and Callen, C. R. (2003). The Juridical Management of Factual Uncertainty. The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 7, 1–30.Google Scholar
Anderson, T., Schum, D. and Twining, W. (2005). Analysis of Evidence, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bayón, J. C. (2008). Epistemología, moral y prueba de los hechos: hacia un enfoque no benthamiano. Analisi e diritto, 2008, 15–34.Google Scholar
Bentham, J. (1827). Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 7 vols., J. Stuart Mill, ed. and cited from the edition included in Bentham, J. : The Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols., edited by J. Bowring, , Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1995.Google Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1977). The Probable and the Provable, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cited from the reprint of Gregg Revivals, Aldershot, 1991.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1986). Twelve Questions About Keynes’s Concept of Weight, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 37(3), 263–78.Google Scholar
Cohen, S. (1999).Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons, in Tomberlin, J. ed., Philosophical Perspectives, Cambridge: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Cobreros Mendazona, E. (2012). Los paradójicos efectos de la protección de la presunción de inocencia sobre el sistema indemnizatorio por prisión provisional indebida. (Las sentencias Puig Panella y Tendam del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos), in García, E. de Enterría and Alonso García, R., eds., Administración y Justicia (Un análisis jurisprudencial). Liber Amicorum Tomás-Ramón Fernández, vol. II, Madrid: Civitas.Google Scholar
De Mateo Menéndez, F. (2011). Responsabilidad patrimonial por prisión preventiva indebida: nueva jurisprudencia. Jueces para la Democracia, 70, 80–91.Google Scholar
Díaz Fraile, F. (2017). La presunción de inocencia y la indemnización por prisión preventiva, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.Google Scholar
Doménech Pascual, G. (2015). ¿Es mejor indemnizar a diez culpables que dejar a un inocente sin compensación? Responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado por los daños causados por la prisión preventiva seguida de absolución o sobreseimiento. InDret, Revista para el análisis del Derecho, 4/2015.Google Scholar
Fantl, J. and McGrath, M. (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification, The Philosophical Review, 111(1), 67–94.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. and Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism, Philosophical Studies, 48(1), 15–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferrer Beltrán, J. (2002). Prueba y verdad en el derecho, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2nd ed. 2005.Google Scholar
Ferrer Beltrán, J. (2007). La valoración racional de la prueba, Madrid: Marcial Pons.Google Scholar
Ferrer Beltrán, J. (2013). Una concepción minimalista y garantista de la presunción de inocencia, in Martí, J. L. and Moreso, J. J., eds., Contribuciones a la filosofía del derecho. Imperia en Barcelona 2010, Madrid: Marcial Pons.Google Scholar
Ferrer Beltrán, J. (2014). La prueba de la causalidad en la responsabilidad civil, in Papayannis, D. M., ed., Causalidad y atribución de responsabilidad, Madrid: Marcial Pons.Google Scholar
Ferrer Beltrán, J. (2017). Presunción de inocencia y prisión preventiva, in Asencio Mellado, J. M. and Alva, J. L. Castillo, eds., Colaboración eficaz, prisión preventiva y prueba, Lima: Ideas-Universitat d’Alacant.Google Scholar
Foley, R. (2000). Epistemically Rational Belief and Responsible Belief, in R. Cobb-Stevens, , ed., Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 5, 181–8.Google Scholar
Gascón Abellán, M. (1999). Los hechos en el derecho. Bases argumentales de la prueba, Madrid: Marcial Pons, 3rd ed. 2010.Google Scholar
Guerra Pérez, C. (2010). La decisión judicial de prisión preventiva (Análisis jurídico y criminológico), Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.Google Scholar
Haack, S. (1993). Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, revised ed. 2001.Google Scholar
Hart, H. L. A. (1961). The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd ed. 1994.Google Scholar
Hawthorne, J. and Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and Action. Journal of Philosophy, 105(10), 571–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hunter, I. (2015). Las dificultades probatorias en el proceso civil. Tratamiento doctrinal y jurisprudencial. Críticas y una propuesta. Revista de Derecho – Universidad Católica del Norte, 22(1), 209–57.Google Scholar
Keynes, J.M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability, London: Macmillan and Co. Cited from the edition of Watchmaker Publishing, 2007.Google Scholar
Laplace, P. S. Marquis de (1814): Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, Paris. Cited from the English translation of Truscott, F. W. and Emory, F. L.: A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, London: John Wiley and Sons, 1902.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (2003). Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable? Legal Theory, 9(4), 295–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laudan, L. (2005). Por qué un estándar de prueba subjetivo y ambiguo no es un estándar. Doxa, 28, 95–113.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (2006). Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (2007). Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof. The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 11(4), 292–306.Google Scholar
Laudan, L. (2016). The Law’s Flaws: Rethinking Trial and Errors?, Milton Keynes: College Publications.Google Scholar
Lowey, A. H. (2009). Taking Reasonable Doubt Seriously. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 85(1), 63–75.Google Scholar
Lupária, L. (2017). La presunción de nocencia en la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea. Revista Vasca de Derecho Procesal y Arbitraje, 29(2), 199–214.Google Scholar
Martin Rebollo, L. (2009). Presunción de inocencia y responsabilidad del Estado: una relación ambigua (a propósito de la sentencia TEDH de 25 de abril de 2006), in AA.VV., Derechos fundamentales y otros estudios, en homenaje al prof. Dr Lorenzo Martín-Retortillo, vol. II, Zaragoza: El Justicia de Aragón.Google Scholar
Mendonca, D. (2000). Las claves del derecho, Barcelona: Gedisa.Google Scholar
Nance, D. A. (2016). The Burdens of Proof. Discriminatory Power, Weight of Evidence, and Tenacity of Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ormazábal, G. (2004). La carga de la prueba y sociedad del riesgo, Madrid: Marcial Pons.Google Scholar
Roberts, P. and Zuckerman, A. (2004). Criminal Evidence, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Roxin, C. (1994). Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre. 2. München: Auflage Beck. D. M. Luzón Peña, M. D. García Conlledo and J. de Vicente Remesal (trans.), Derecho Penal. Parte General, Civitas, 2003.Google Scholar
Rysiew, P. (2001). The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions, Noûs, 35(4), 477–514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solan, L. M. (1999). Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt. Texas Law Review, 78, 105–47.Google Scholar
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interest, Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Stein, A. (1997). Against Free Proof, Israel Law Review, 31, 573–89.Google Scholar
Stein, A. (2005). Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Taruffo, M. (1992). La prova dei fatti giuridici, Milano: Giuffrè.Google Scholar
Tolivar Alas, L. (2009). La adjetivación reductora del error judicial: ¿un fraude de Constitución? Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, 142, 203–24.Google Scholar
Twining, W. (1990). Rethinking Evidence. Exploratory Essays, cited from the 2nd ed., Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994.Google Scholar
Ullmann-Margalit, E. (1983). On Presumption. Journal of Philosophy, 80(3), 143–63.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×