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11 - Sanctions for Acts or Sanctions for Actors?

from Part III - On Evidential Inferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2022

By
Frederick Schauer
Edited by
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán  and
Carmen Vázquez
Jordi Ferrer Beltrán
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
Carmen Vázquez
Affiliation:
Universitat de Girona
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Summary

As a number of modern sexual misconduct cases demonstrate, often there are multiple charges against a single individual under circumstances in which the proof of an individual charge may fall short of the required standard of proof, but in which it is clear – overwhelmingly, or beyond a reasonable doubt – that at least one of the charges is true, even if we cannot be sure which one. Building on earlier work by myself and Richard Zeckhauser, by Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, and by Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, among others, this paper, prepared for the World Congress on Evidential Reasoning at the University of Girona, offers a sympathetic examination of sanction imposition – inside and outside formal legal proceedings – on the basis of aggregate probabilities, and addresses a series of common objections. And the paper suggests that the greatest value of aggregating low (or lower) probability charges may be greatest outside the official judicial process. It also hints, albeit inconclusively, at the larger question of why the law focuses on acts when it is imposing sanctions rather than focusing on the actors who may have committed those acts.

Keywords

Reasonable doubtsanction impositionjudicial processaggregative probability
Type
Chapter
Information
Evidential Legal Reasoning
Crossing Civil Law and Common Law Traditions
 , pp. 198 - 214
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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