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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2021

David A. Lagnado
David A. Lagnado
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University College London
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Explaining the Evidence
How the Mind Investigates the World
 , pp. 282 - 298
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • References
  • David A. Lagnado, University College London
  • Book: Explaining the Evidence
  • Online publication: 20 October 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9780511794520.013
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  • References
  • David A. Lagnado, University College London
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  • References
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  • Book: Explaining the Evidence
  • Online publication: 20 October 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9780511794520.013
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