Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of Contributors
- Explanation—Opening Address
- Explanation in Psychology
- Explanation in Biology
- Explanation in Social Sciences
- Explanation in Physics
- 1 Explanation
- 2 Explanation in Physical Theory
- The Limits of Explanation
- Supervenience and Singular Causal Claims
- Contrastive Explanations
- How to Put Questions to Nature
- Explanation and Scientific Realism
- How Do Scientific Explanations Explain?
- Index
2 - Explanation in Physical Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of Contributors
- Explanation—Opening Address
- Explanation in Psychology
- Explanation in Biology
- Explanation in Social Sciences
- Explanation in Physics
- 1 Explanation
- 2 Explanation in Physical Theory
- The Limits of Explanation
- Supervenience and Singular Causal Claims
- Contrastive Explanations
- How to Put Questions to Nature
- Explanation and Scientific Realism
- How Do Scientific Explanations Explain?
- Index
Summary
Introduction: Epistemology and The Philosophy of Physics
The corpus of physical theory is a paradigm of knowledge. The evolution of modern physical theory constitutes the clearest exemplar of the growth of knowledge. If the development of physical theory does not constitute an example of progress and growth in what we know about the Universe nothing does. So anyone interested in the theory of knowledge must be interested consequently in the evolution and content of physical theory. Crucial to the conception of physics as a paradigm of knowledge is the way in which physical theory provides explanations of a vast diversity of natural phenomena on the basis of a very few fundamental principles. A central problem for the epistemologist is therefore what is theoretical explanation in physics? Here we can get good insight from what Redhead has said (this volume pp. 145–54).’ Indeed one could agree with almost everything Redhead says and simply endorse much of his careful and extensive defence of the covering law account of explanation in the physical sciences at least as an ideal. However I shall, I fear, try the reader's patience by extending some of the considerations he introduced and raising those issues where we disagree, especially in the important area of statistical explanation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Explanation and its Limits , pp. 155 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991