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10 - The Faustian Bargain

Power-Sharing, Constitutions, and the Practice of Polycentricity in Governance

from Part III - Constituting Polycentric Governance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 September 2019

Andreas Thiel
Affiliation:
Universität Kassel, Germany
William A. Blomquist
Affiliation:
Indiana University–Purdue University, Indianapolis
Dustin E. Garrick
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

Constitution-making involves a 'Faustian bargain' in which individuals and smaller communities give up some of their autonomy for the sake of the benefits brought by larger-scale societies. Transitioning from small-scale quasi-egalitarian societies towards a complex, but more hierarchical, political system makes possible collective action and the provision of public goods at much larger scales, including defence, establishing larger common markets, and basic infrastructure. After introducing the concept of the 'Faustian' bargain, the chapter explains how constitutive rules create such bargains. We turn to the role of monitoring, conflict resolution, and sanctioning as means of building commitments to constitutions, providing for stability and flexibility. The chapter illustrates these relationships using two cases of constitution-making: the multi-level governance of New York City watersheds, and post-conflict situations in which leaders of different ethnic groups come to agreement.

Type
Chapter
Information
Governing Complexity
Analyzing and Applying Polycentricity
, pp. 219 - 236
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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