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13 - Majoritarianism, Majoritarian Tension, and the Reed Revolution

from Part III - Partisanship and Governmental Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 October 2016

Alan S. Gerber
Affiliation:
Yale University, Connecticut
Eric Schickler
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

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Type
Chapter
Information
Governing in a Polarized Age
Elections, Parties, and Political Representation in America
, pp. 328 - 368
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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