Book contents
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- 14 Growing Minds
- 15 “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”
- 16 Habit and the Human Lifespan
- 17 Habits and the Enculturated Mind
- 18 Brain, Body, Habit, and the Performative Quality of Aesthetics
- 19 A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences
- 20 Social Ontology between Habits and Social Interactions
- 21 Social Reproduction Feminism and Deweyan Habit Ontology
- Index
- References
15 - “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”
Pragmatism, Social Theory, and Cognitive Science
from Part III - Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2020
Book contents
- Habits
- Habits
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- The Pragmatist Reappraisal of Habit in Contemporary Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory: Introductory Essay
- Part 1 The Sensorimotor Embodiment of Habits
- Part II The Enactment of Habits in Mind and World
- Part III Socially Embeddded and Culturally Extended Habits
- 14 Growing Minds
- 15 “Habit Is Thus the Enormous Flywheel of Society”
- 16 Habit and the Human Lifespan
- 17 Habits and the Enculturated Mind
- 18 Brain, Body, Habit, and the Performative Quality of Aesthetics
- 19 A Habit Ontology for Cognitive and Social Sciences
- 20 Social Ontology between Habits and Social Interactions
- 21 Social Reproduction Feminism and Deweyan Habit Ontology
- Index
- References
Summary
Pragmatism arose in response to the dominant philosophical ideas of the time, one of which was neo-Kantianism. Present approaches in cognitive science often derive from basic neo-Kantian ideas, notably the notion that social life and language depend on shared “frames.” Pragmatism rejected these neo-Kantian ideas, and instead relied on an extended notion of habit. But the extension required a response to some core neo-Kantian concerns. Pragmatism provided some psychological thinking, especially in William James, and in the critique of the reflex arc concept. This was paralleled and extended by Russian psychologists. They developed a research program which supported alternative accounts of the key problematics of neo-Kantianism, such as the nature of categories and of abstraction. This bears directly on social theory, which uncritically adopted ideas of shared frameworks as an explanatory shortcut, without providing a psychological or cognitive account of how this kind of sharing was possible.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- HabitsPragmatist Approaches from Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and Social Theory, pp. 320 - 336Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020
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