Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Map
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Austria and Modernity
- 1 1815–1835: Restoration and Procrastination
- 2 1835–1851: Revolution and Reaction
- 3 1852–1867: Transformation
- 4 1867–1879: Liberalisation
- 5 1879–1897: Nationalisation
- 6 1897–1914: Modernisation
- 7 1914–1918: Self-Destruction
- Conclusion: Central Europe and the Paths Not Taken
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - 1835–1851: Revolution and Reaction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 May 2018
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Map
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: Austria and Modernity
- 1 1815–1835: Restoration and Procrastination
- 2 1835–1851: Revolution and Reaction
- 3 1852–1867: Transformation
- 4 1867–1879: Liberalisation
- 5 1879–1897: Nationalisation
- 6 1897–1914: Modernisation
- 7 1914–1918: Self-Destruction
- Conclusion: Central Europe and the Paths Not Taken
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Franz I died on 2 March 1835, after an eventful four decades as Habsburg ruler. His successor, as one would have expected according to the dictates of legitimacy, was his eldest son, Ferdinand. Franz left his heir a testament (composed largely by Metternich) whose central advice was, predictably, ‘to rule and not to alter’, but one might have expected that the relatively young new emperor (Ferdinand had been born in 1793) would nevertheless be a force for change, as relatively young rulers often are. This was not the case. Ferdinand would, it is true, preside over a revolution during his reign, but it would not be of his bidding; the real agent of change would be another, much younger Habsburg, his nephew, Franz Joseph. Over the next fifteen or so years, Austria would stagnate under an only slightly amended version of Metternich's System, its government trying more to hold back change than to take advantage of the many opportunities opened up by mid-nineteenth-century technological advances and the growth of a new economy and society. The paralysis of the centre would encourage ever more pressure from the increasingly nationalist peripheries, which came to full flood in the revolutions of 1848. Yet the very contradictions of multiple nationalisms in one polity, the lack of political experience of the populace and the strength of traditional values of loyalty and faith in the existing, monarchical order would redound to the benefit, and survival, of the Monarchy, giving it and its new emperor one more chance to adjust to the new, modern world. The response was to go back to a new version of the old, absolutist ways.
The System Seizes Up
The main reason why Ferdinand was not an agent of change was also a major problem for a government that ruled according to the principle of dynastic legitimacy: Ferdinand was mentally incompetent. This had been clear for many years, and had not legitimacy played such a role in Habsburg thinking, another of the somewhat more intelligent brothers, Ludwig probably, would have succeeded, but Ferdinand was intent on being emperor, as was his right, and so he was.
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- Information
- The Habsburg Monarchy 1815–1918 , pp. 54 - 86Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2018