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2 - Conquering Germania

A Province Too Far

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2012

Williamson Murray
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
Peter R. Mansoor
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
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Summary

A small German tribe rose in revolt and in immediate reaction three legions marched. Their commander, Varus, was well schooled in the Roman method of stifling insurrections: React rapidly and massively at the first sign of trouble. Following the Roman playbook, which he had implemented to good effect in the Eastern Empire, Varus led his legions through recently “pacified” Germania, demonstrating for all to behold the might of Rome. The Romans knew from experience that, left to fester, uprisings grew worse and more expensive in blood and treasure the longer they delayed action. At the onset of rebellion, the preferred Roman method was a rapid march with all troops available; followed by a short, bloody, decisive engagement; and concluded with a flurry of swift trials and slow executions. Unfortunately for Varus, his opponent, Arminius, was Roman educated and trained and therefore intimately familiar with the Roman playbook.

The legions marched as if they had few concerns. Spread out over almost 10 miles, the formation became ragged. Many of the legionnaires walked unarmed among the baggage and camp followers. At no place did Varus maintain the tactical integrity of the legions. Worse, the German auxiliary force, commanded by Varus’ “trusted” adviser, Arminius, had received permission to ride off and ensure the route ahead was clear of obstructions or threats. Believing that Arminius would alert him to any trouble in sufficient time to form his legions, Varus marched unprepared.

Type
Chapter
Information
Hybrid Warfare
Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present
, pp. 18 - 44
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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