1 - An Inexhaustible Source of Power

Summary

Chapter 1 investigates the introduction of knowledge about the conversion of river flows into electricity to China in the late Qing and early Republican periods. Despite the prominence of fossil fuel energy in the industrialized world, certain Chinese intellectuals advocated harnessing the country’s abundant river resources to produce electricity as a means of achieving full national independence. Local elites took the lead in constructing the first set of hydropower stations in southwest China, and afterwards an increasing number of Chinese elites recognized the potential of hydropower in the country. As a result, in the context of a long-term national crisis, hydropower came to be, for many people, synonymous with the strengthening of the Chinese nation.

In 1894, as the First Sino-Japanese War loomed on the horizon, a young Sun Yat-sen, then just twenty-eight years of age, wrote a passionate petition to Li Hongzhang, the most prominent official associated with the Self-Strengthening movement in the final decades of the Qing era. In his letter, Sun implored Li to enact reforms in crucial areas such as education, agriculture, technology, and transportation. In particular, he emphasized the importance of technology, foretelling the arrival of the electrical age and its boundless potential. Sun wrote, “Recently, a revolutionary new method has emerged – the harnessing of the power of waterfalls to generate and store electricity, an inexhaustible source of power that can be used at any time and any place.”¹ In a period when the country still relied overwhelmingly on the manual labor of its people, some enlightened Chinese figures, like Sun, began to envision a future in which alternative energy production would play a crucial role in shaping the nation’s future.²

Sun Yat-sen’s prophetic words, referring to a “new method of producing an inexhaustible source of power,” have come to fruition as what we know today as hydroelectricity. The utilization of waterpower, however, is by no means a novel concept. In ancient Europe, for example, watermills powered by the natural force of flowing water had become an integral part of daily life. These watermills, which converted the power of water into mechanical force, relieved countless people of the grueling and monotonous task of grinding grains. The following epigram from the Anthology speaks to this revolutionary change:

Spare your hands, which have been long familiar with the millstone, you maidens who used to crush the grain. Henceforth you shall sleep long, oblivious of the crowing cocks who greet the dawn. For what was your task, Demeter has now handed on to the Nymphs.³

William the Conqueror’s 1086 Domesday Book survey reveals the presence of thousands of small water-driven mills in England and estimates that one mill existed for every fifty households.⁴ However, the use of these mills was limited by environmental factors such as meteorology, topography, and geology. The mills primarily performed essential tasks such as producing grist, sawing, carding, and fulling, all crucial for the agricultural society of the time. For over a millennium and a half prior to the invention of the steam engine in 1769, water-powered machinery represented the most advanced and widely utilized mechanical technology in human society.⁵ Even after the dawn of the first Industrial Revolution and its increasing reliance on fossil fuels, waterpower remained an important source of energy in Europe and the Americas. In the 1820s, the people of Lowell, Massachusetts, sought to overcome seasonal fluctuations in waterpower capacity by constructing a complex system of hydraulic works: Large masonry dams and protective walls, networks of distribution canals equipped with water gates and spillways, and upstream storage reservoirs. This was the first successful experiment in overcoming the physical and natural limitations of waterpower and stabilizing its output for the operation of mills. As a result, Lowell was transformed into the first “factory town” and the center of the textile industry in North America.⁶

What was the experience of waterpower in Chinese history? From the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) onward, people harnessed the power of water for a multitude of purposes. The watermill played a crucial role in processing grain for the agricultural economy, also powering the development of tea and textile workshops, enabling the development of a commodity economy in certain regions.⁷ However, the “new method of producing an inexhaustible source of power” that Sun Yat-sen spoke of in his letter and that is now known as hydroelectricity was first developed in Europe. My extensive examination of primary sources from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveals a nuanced perspective on the dissemination of hydroelectric knowledge in China. While the story of hydroelectricity may initially seem to fit within the conventional narrative of the transfer of Western science and technology to China, a closer examination reveals more complex dynamics.⁸ This chapter argues that the development of hydropower in China was not simply a straightforward replication of the Western experience but rather a process of adaptive appropriation. This involved the adaptation of hydroelectric principles to the features of local communities, environmental factors, and the prevailing political situation in the country.

This chapter undertakes a dual exploration of the early development of hydropower in China. On the one hand, it provides an intimate look at the experiences of three local elites who built small hydroelectric plants in southwest China. On the other, it describes the transformation of Chinese elites’ understanding of China’s hydropower potential, from initial skepticism to an eventual recognition of abundance. In the context of a persistent national crisis, many Chinese elites began to see hydropower as a key component in the project of building a strong, self-sufficient nation that was free from foreign aggression. The co-occurrence in the early twentieth century of the spread of hydroelectric knowledge and technology from the West and Chinese elites’ search for means of national strengthening created a unique opportunity for the flourishing of both forces. The recognition of the potential of China’s abundant hydropower resources promised a bright future for the nation. Thus, the seed of a hydropower nation was planted and awaited nurturing in the decades to come.

The Rise of “White Coal”

During the Industrial Revolution, the rise of fossil fuels overshadowed the use of waterpower, which until then had been limited to locations near streams and rivers and was best suited to areas with waterfalls. Despite this shift, a lineage of hydraulic engineers continued to refine the waterwheel, the cornerstone of waterpower technology, and to increase its efficiency. In 1837, the French engineer Benoit Fourneyron, building on the research of Claude Burdin, invented the turbine, a revolutionary new type of waterwheel. Capable of producing 2,300 revolutions per minute with 80 percent efficiency and 60 horsepower, the turbine was a significant improvement in waterpower technology. The challenge of transmission remained. In 1895, at Niagara Falls, the Fourneyron turbine was put into use, converting waterpower into electricity on a massive scale for the first time in history. This breakthrough, coupled with the development by Nikola Tesla in the late 1880s of a poly-phase alternating current system of generator, motor, and transformer, made long-distance transmission possible and ushered in the new era of hydroelectricity.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, major technological advancements in hydroelectricity occurred, primarily in Europe and North America, but then quickly spread to the East through transnational networks of missionaries.⁹ In 1868, the American missionary W. A. P. Martin made a notable contribution to this transmission of knowledge. As a teacher and interpreter for the Translation Bureau in Beijing, Martin wrote Introduction to Science (Gewu Rumen 格物入门), a comprehensive textbook on Western science. In the section on water, Martin highlights a type of waterwheel referred to as the “watermill horizontal wheel” (shuimo wolun 水磨卧轮), which is in fact the Fourneyron turbine. He explains the principle of its operation in clear and concise terms: “Water is directed into the wheel’s rim through a ten-foot-long vertical penstock. The wheel is fitted with curved buckets, which cause it to rotate as the velocity of the water drives it. The longer the penstock, the greater the power and speed of the wheel’s revolution.”¹⁰ At the beginning of the twentieth century, the American missionary Young J. Allen began reporting on the hydropower projects at Niagara Falls in the Chinese Globe Magazine. Further, in 1898, the editorial board of Scientific Review, a journal published in Shanghai, in response to a question from a reader about the importance of waterpower relative to other sources of energy, acknowledged the benefits of waterpower but also acknowledged its limitations with respect to China. They noted, “There are only a few waterfalls in China, making waterpower less viable than wind power. It would be more advantageous if we could develop steam power, which surpasses waterpower in ease of use.”¹¹ Despite China’s long history of using watermills, the conventional wisdom of the time saw the country as lacking in hydropower potential.

By the early twentieth century, Europe and North America were undergoing two major scientific and technological advancements that would pave the way for the widespread use of hydroelectricity. In addition to the turbine, hydraulic engineering was developed further to stabilize and maximize the energy-producing capacity of water, while the invention of alternating current made long-distance transmission of electricity a reality.¹² These technological innovations made hydropower more accessible and sustainable than coal-powered electricity, leading to a boom in its use in Europe and North America in the years following World War I. According to a 1934 census of installed electricity capacity in several major countries, hydropower dominated the energy mix in countries such as Canada, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, accounting for over 90 percent of total capacity. France and Japan also had substantial shares of hydropower, at 70 and 85 percent, respectively, while in the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union the shares were 45, 40, and 20 percent, respectively.¹³ In certain areas, such as Lowell in North America and the Alpine region in Europe, hydropower had become the primary source of electricity for industrial production and daily illumination. The term “white coal” initially referred to the glacial streams flowing down from mountains, but had by this period become synonymous with hydropower, reflecting its increasing importance and its equivalence to coal, if not yet its superiority.¹⁴

As the demand for energy continued to grow, people started to acknowledge the limitations of coal as a source of power. The burning of coal produced ash that contaminated the air and, as a finite resource, it could not meet the increasing energy needs of society forever. In contrast, hydropower was seen as a clean and renewable alternative, offering a promising future for modern industrial civilization. In the early twentieth century, the feeling among many was that the trend of industrialization was moving toward hydro-electrification.¹⁵

As Shellen Wu illustrates in her work, the exploitation of natural resources, such as coal mines, has long been intertwined with issues of state power and sovereignty.¹⁶ In the early decades of the twentieth century, China’s resistance against imperialist invasions, particularly the incursions of the Japanese military, fueled a surge of nationalism. In their pursuit of economic development and political independence, Chinese elites saw it as their duty to harness the full potential of their nation’s resources, including harnessing the energy of its rivers through the generation of hydropower. Their goal was not only to reconstruct and improve robust local economies but also to forge a strong, sovereign nation that could compete and succeed on the global stage.

In the early years of hydropower development, the presence of waterfalls was felt to be essential. As China lacked large waterfalls, many believed that its potential for hydropower was limited. However, with the advent of hydro-engineering, particularly with improvements in the construction of dams and penstock, perceptions of China’s hydropower potential changed dramatically. Advances in hydrology and scientific studies of rivers further fueled this shift, as engineers and stakeholders grew increasingly optimistic about the prospects for hydropower in the country. According to the National Resources Commission of the Nationalist government in the late 1930s, China was estimated to have a potential hydropower capacity of over 40 million kilowatts, which would rank it as the third largest producer in the world, after only the United States and Canada.¹⁷ This new recognition of China’s hydropower potential served as a foundation for the confidence of Chinese civil engineers in the importance of hydropower in the country’s state-building efforts. In Shanghai, for example, a quarter of the city’s power plants were under foreign control and relied heavily on petroleum as their primary energy source.¹⁸ However, this dependence on imported petroleum was viewed as a threat to China’s national sovereignty.¹⁹ The belief that China had enormous potential for hydropower – as opposed to oil fields, which were understood to be limited – took hold among the interested public. As Lu Shiqian 卢世钤, a college student studying civil engineering in Shanghai, put it: “We should build hydroelectric plants anywhere we can to power our factories. With a cheap energy supply, our products will be able to compete with foreign goods and keep profits in the country. If we have sufficient hydropower energy, we will be able to stop importing oil from abroad, bringing us far greater benefits!”²⁰ Lu was not alone in his concern for the future of China’s energy industry and its place in the world. This economic nationalism, rooted in the logic of the self-strengthening movement of the late Qing period, persisted through the twentieth century and was evident not only in the movements against imported goods but also in the pursuit of energy self-sufficiency, with a focus on hydropower development.²¹

Since the outbreak of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan had occupied the attention of Chinese intellectuals. The engineer Shan Yubin 单毓斌 visited a power plant in Japan and wrote about his experience for his fellow Chinese, lamenting,

Alas! Japanese entrepreneurs have invested heavily in developing hydroelectricity for the sake of their nation, leaving us far behind. Our country has its own mountains and rivers, including the renowned Qutang and Ba Gorges. If we bring together capitalists and engineers, our nation can greatly benefit from exploiting its hydropower potential.²²

Further, Japanese hydropower construction in Manchuria and Taiwan embarrassed many Chinese intellectuals. In 1924, Japan completed the Riyuetan 日月潭 Hydropower Plant in Taiwan with an installed capacity of 100,000 kilowatts, making it the largest in Asia at the time.²³ Despite the rapid growth of Japan’s hydropower industry, it did not possess the technology to produce large generators and turbines and thus had to import them from Germany and the United States.²⁴ This further fueled the sense of urgency among Chinese elites, who were concerned that their country’s energy sector would lag far behind Japan’s. It is not surprising, then, that many civil engineers would become advocates for the development of hydropower in the aftermath of the Japanese invasions.

However, the question of how China could most quickly catch up with Japan and the other industrial nations in energy production loomed large. Some Chinese people looked northward for a solution. The Soviet Union, with its experience of electrification and hydropower development, emerged as an attractive alternative model.²⁵ As people in China learned about the Bolshevik revolution, they learned not only Marxist ideology but also about the Soviet experience of electrification. Impressed by what they saw as the Soviet Union’s rapid transformation from a weak and poor nation into a strong industrial power, some Chinese sought inspiration from it.

Chen Zudong 陈祖东 was a civil engineer who graduated from Tsinghua University in 1935. He was also a cousin of Chen Guofu 陈果夫, who served as the minister of the Organization Department of the Kuomintang. In 1932, he lamented,

China’s abundance of population and natural resources, including the mighty Yangtze River, should have given it a distinct advantage in supporting industrialization. Yet, the lack of a unified plan for economic construction and the ongoing wars between warlords have left the Chinese people to suffer. In contrast, the leaders of the Soviet Union display a pragmatic attitude, leading to its rapid growth and rising influence among world powers. It is a source of shame for the Chinese people to lag so far behind despite their wealth of resources!²⁶

During his visit to the Soviet Union in 1939, Chen wrote journals to record his experiences and was deeply impressed by the Soviet Union’s central planning and authoritarian capacity to force state policies through to completion, which he believed had led to the rapid growth of industrial production in Russia. He suggested that China should adopt the Soviet model to develop its energy sector.²⁷

Many in China were aware of the close relationship between energy production and a country’s global standing as they observed the experiences of electrification in industrial countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union. They understood that an underdeveloped country like China needed a comprehensive national plan and a competent, if not authoritarian, government with strong executive power if it was to advance on this front. By the mid-twentieth century, hydropower, despite its unfamiliarity to many, had become a crucial indicator of national competence. As Chen Zudong put it, the construction of hydropower capacity should be embraced without hesitation as “the formula for China’s national reconstruction.”²⁸

Local Pioneers

Despite this change in the consciousness of certain elites, before 1935 the use of hydropower in China was limited to a few scattered localities.²⁹ Western scientific theories of hydroelectricity were introduced by foreign missionaries and progressive Chinese intellectuals, but it was Chinese entrepreneurs who put the knowledge into practice. They viewed the construction of hydropower plants as a sound investment, a “once and for all” source of power that would have long-term or even permanent benefits. Upon learning about the construction of hydroelectricity plants at Niagara Falls in the United States and Canada, some Chinese businessmen expressed amazement at the apparently endless benefits that such a project could offer: “How could the benefits ever be exhausted?”³⁰

Yaolong 耀龙 and Jihe 济和

In the early years of China’s interactions with foreigners in the late Qing and early Republican periods, local businessmen were the primary supporters of hydropower development. As Elisabeth Koll has shown, the construction of railroads in China involved extensive collaboration between foreigners and Chinese.³¹ Indeed, this transformative infrastructure project played an important role in the development of China’s first hydropower project. In 1897, France was granted permission to build a railway connecting Haiphong in Vietnam and Kunming in Yunnan province, but this sparked an intense negative reaction in Kunming.³² In May 1900, a Catholic cathedral was burned down and the religious leaders of all the Christian denominations in the city were forced to flee.³³ Despite the turmoil and upheaval, a tiny Anglo-French business community persevered. To provide power for the railway station that was then under construction, a French survey team proposed the construction of a hydropower plant along the winding course of the Tanglang River 螳螂川 in Yunnan. This river was the sole outlet of the massive Dian Lake 滇池 and flowed for over 360 kilometers before merging with the Jinsha River 金沙江 to the north. The steep terrain and the lake’s potential as a natural reservoir promised an ample supply of hydropower.³⁴

While the French celebrated their own railway as a project “worthy of the genius of the French,”³⁵ many Chinese businesspeople saw it as a threat to their commercial interests and to China‘s larger national interests. These businesspeople believed that the exploitation of hydropower was an “economic benefit and a political right of the Chinese nation and people.”³⁶ With the aim of harnessing the energy of the Tanglang River, Liu Lingfang 刘苓舫, the director of the Bureau of Business Promotion in Yunnan, proposed the establishment of a plant to be “jointly managed by officials and businesspeople.” Despite his efforts, however, few businessmen showed interest in the project.³⁷ Undeterred, the Kunming Chamber of Commerce stepped in and petitioned the local county magistrate to allow them to raise funds among themselves to build the hydropower plant. Under the leadership of Wang Xiaozhai 王筱斋, the owner of a private bank, a joint-stock corporation called the Kunming Yaolong Light Company was established to manage the construction and operation of the plant.³⁸ With the help of private investment and local initiative, the first hydroelectric plant in China, the Shilongba 石龙坝, was finally completed and brought into operation in Kunming in 1910 (Figure 1.1).³⁹

Figure 1.1 Shilongba Hydropower Plant

(Photo by zhouyousifang/Moment via Getty Images)

Despite the nationalist motivations behind the project’s inception, the Kunming Yaolong Light company had no choice but to seek technical support and machinery from foreign sources.⁴⁰ Through the mediation of Carlowitz & Company, a German trading firm with an office in Shanghai, the electrical equipment and turbines were provided by Siemens and Voith, respectively. The latter also dispatched two engineers to help with the design and construction. By 1912, the Yaolong Company had constructed a 1.478-kilometer canal and installed 480 kW of electrical equipment, ready to provide power to Kunming.⁴¹ This was a pioneering project in China in another way, as it was the first to utilize high voltage alternating current (23,000 V) to transmit electricity over the relatively long distance of 35 kilometers to downtown Kunming.

The introduction of electric light in Kunming was initially met with skepticism and resistance. Despite the technical advancement that the Shilongba Hydropower Plant represented, the inconsistent and sometimes unstable supply of power was a major hindrance to the widespread adoption of electricity. Every night, just before 10:00 pm, light bulbs in the city would dim to a mere “glow of incense sticks,” and residents would use their kerosene lamps for light.⁴² Further, the plant’s output exceeded the initial market demand. But the Yaolong Company did not give up on its mission to bring the benefits of electricity to the people of Kunming. They undertook a concerted effort to advertise the advantages of electric light and installed light bulbs for free to entice potential customers. These efforts paid off and the operation of the company soon became viable. Four months after its inauguration, more than 3,000 lamps had been sold. Seven local mills and factories began to use electricity as their primary source for driving equipment as well as illumination.⁴³ By 1923, the growing demand for electricity compelled the company to expand its installed capacity to meet the new needs of the community. The Shilongba Hydropower Plant thus played a pivotal role in the electrification of Kunming and the surrounding areas.

Following the success of the Yaolong plant, another hydropower project – named Jihe – was established in 1925 along the Longxi 龙溪 River in Luzhou 泸州, Sichuan. The Jihe project was designed by a talented civil engineer, Shui Xiheng 税西恒, who was born in Luzhou and had received training in mechanical engineering in Germany. After working briefly for Siemens, Shui returned to Sichuan and served as the director of the Southern Sichuan Construction Bureau.⁴⁴ With his professional training and local connections, Shui was able to convince local merchants and officials to invest in a hydroelectric plant that would harness the hydropower of the Longxi River. A curved masonry dam, standing 2.5 meters tall and stretching 80 meters across the river, was built to control water for the generation of electricity. The equipment required for the project, including a turbine and a 140-kW generator, was imported from Germany.⁴⁵ In the construction of the Shilongba and Jihe projects, a unique solution was found to overcome the problem of a shortage of cement, and a sticky rice slurry was used as a substitute.⁴⁶ In Nanping 南平, Fujian province, meanwhile, Ji Tinghong 纪亭洪, a member of the local gentry, used an indigenous wooden water wheel to drive a generator, thus providing an early example of blending traditional knowledge and local materials with advanced engineering technology.⁴⁷ These innovations and experiments, much like Eugenia Lean’s study of “vernacular industrialism,” show that the development of hydroelectricity in China was not solely a transfer of Western technology but rather a process that involved adaptation, local expertise, and practical experience.⁴⁸ These factors are often overlooked in current narratives of hydropower engineering.

Fuyuan 富源

During the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945), the picturesque town of Beibei 北碚, located 60 kilometers north of the bustling city of Chongqing, became a kind of sanctuary for various institutions and offices of the Kuomintang government, universities, merchants, and others. Beibei was situated along the banks of the Jialing River, providing convenient transportation to Chongqing despite heavy bombing in the area by the Japanese. The river featured rapid currents and smooth, rounded rocks that stood above the water, which provided the inspiration for the town’s name: “Bei” meaning north and “bei” meaning rock, or “Northern Rock.” The town’s three main streets were full of activity, especially on market days when farmers from the surrounding countryside arrived before dawn to sell their produce. The migration of the Nationalist government to the area in the early phases of the war had brought increased business and higher prices, and boats on the Jialing River brought additional goods to the town.⁴⁹ At night, the town was illuminated by flickering vegetable oil lamps, while restaurants and households awaited the arrival of electricity. When it finally arrived, according to one observer, “suddenly there was a universal ‘Ah!’ and claps of hands and believe it or not, it was the electricity!”⁵⁰ Even in wartime, Beibei was an important hub of commerce and community.

The demand for energy in Beibei, including electricity, skyrocketed with the arrival of industries from elsewhere and the growth of the refugee population. The town’s municipal authority had already built a coal-fired power plant to provide electricity to the district, but its capacity was insufficient to meet rising demand brought on by the war. Furthermore, coal was a precious resource and was earmarked by the government for powering munitions factories, which were prioritized during the war. It was against this backdrop that Lu Zuofu 卢作孚, the director of the shipping company Minsheng 民生 (People’s Livelihood), proposed the construction of a hydropower plant on the Liangtan 梁滩 River at Gaokengyan 高坑岩 to support the growing refugee community.

In fact, the idea of harnessing the energy of the Liangtan River for generating electricity had been in Lu Zuofu’s mind since 1933. He saw the potential of the river and its waterfalls and, despite facing initial financial challenges, submitted an application to the local government and sent engineers to survey the river in that year.⁵¹ He was not alone in that idea, as the renowned educator and rural reconstruction activist Yan Yangchu 晏阳初, better known in English as Jimmy Yen, also saw the potential of the waterfalls and established the China Rural Construction College near Beibei in 1940 because of its proximity to this resource.⁵² It was not until the latter stages of the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1943, however, that the rising demand for energy in the refugee-rich town of Beibei, combined with support from the Water Conservancy Commission, the Communication Bank, Jincheng Bank, and other local entrepreneurs, finally provided Lu with the opportunity to make his idea a reality. He relaunched his hydropower plan and established the hydroelectric company Fuyuan, meaning “source of wealth.”

The Liangtan River originated in the towering peaks of Bi Mountain in Sichuan province and eventually converged with the Jialing River near Beibei. This river had tremendous potential for the production of hydroelectricity. The rapids at Gaokengyan, where the river plummeted 40 feet, were an excellent location for a hydropower plant. While hydroelectricity is attractive in terms of its affordability once facilities have been built, it requires substantial upfront investment. Thus, the Fuyuan Company, like many other small-scale hydropower plants, used a joint-stock system to raise the necessary funds. With an initial share capital of 20 million yuan, consisting of 20,000 shares of 1,000 yuan each, the company attracted a diverse array of investors.⁵³ At their first meeting, the founders elected Lu Zuofu as chair of the board of directors. Lu’s company, Minsheng, took on the task of manufacturing the hydro turbines required for the project itself, setting it apart from other companies like Yaolong and Jihe who imported their turbines from abroad. This was a testament to Lu’s commitment to bringing the vision of this project to life. The establishment of Fuyuan was made possible by the combined efforts of a number of influential figures who brought with them not only financial resources but technical expertise as well. As a joint-stock enterprise, the company aimed to provide electricity for both domestic and commercial purposes, including household lighting and power for small and middle-sized factories. Reports estimated that when Fuyuan was built Beibei already had around 600 light bulbs, averaging 15 watts and powered by coal. However, with their confidence in the potential of hydroelectricity, the founders of Fuyuan believed they had the capacity to power another 3,000 bulbs.⁵⁴ The future of the company seemed promising.

A New Man-Made Disaster

Chris Courtney has elegantly explained that floods are the result of a complex interplay of natural forces and human interference.⁵⁵ Throughout Chinese history, human actions have altered the landscape and waterways, and the creation of concrete dams and the implementation of hydropower technology have only enhanced our ability to manipulate rivers. The Liangtan River had tremendous hydropower potential but its flow was unpredictable, fluctuating greatly depending on the amount of rainfall in the area. To ensure a stable flow and the presence of enough water to generate electricity consistently throughout the year, a dam had to be constructed upstream from the power plant. Unfortunately, this led to conflict between the local community and the power company.

The Liangtan River had been used as a source of mechanical power for decades but not by the hydropower company. A number of watermills were in operation along the river, processing grain for local communities. The construction of the dam, however, caused the water level to rise and disrupted the operation of the watermills. Low-lying areas along the river were also flooded for the first time. To mitigate the negative impacts, the company built a lower dam with a sluice gate to regulate the water level in case of emergencies.⁵⁶ The company also implemented strict regulations for the use of the sluice gate. Despite these efforts, the reservoir still submerged farmlands, bridges, and roads. To address this, the company raised the height of bridges and roads to maintain accessibility, but it could not prevent the submerging of farmlands whose owners it had to compensate. To gain the support of local communities, the company reached out to local leaders and security groups. Jiang Gengqiao 蒋耕樵, the town chief of Xinglongxiang 兴隆乡, was supportive and saw supporting the nation’s development efforts as a duty of local societies. He recommended two members of the local gentry, Lü Siqi 吕思齐 and Liu Yingzhou 刘瀛洲, to the company as advisors, as he believed they not only appreciated the value of the hydropower project but were also well-acquainted with the local situation.⁵⁷

Lü Siqi, however, owned one of the watermills that had been impacted by the dam. His millhouse was in danger of collapsing because of the rising water. He wrote a letter to the company’s manager, expressing concern about the financial loss the dam had caused him.⁵⁸ The company promised to raise his watermills and compensate him for his losses, but months went by and nothing was done. Frustrated, Lü took further action. A heavy rainfall in 1946 resulted in accidental flooding of farmlands and watermills along the dammed river, further fueling local residents’ dissatisfaction. Lü, as an influential member of the gentry, not only defended his own interests but also rallied local residents to protect their properties. He organized a petition delegation and brought their concerns to the public media, putting pressure on the hydropower company and local government to act.

In their petition, Lü and his followers referred to the flood as a man-made disaster and blamed it on the construction of the dam. They argued that the project posed a threat to public welfare, treated the local community unjustly, and undermined the efforts of resistance and reconstruction.⁵⁹ The hydropower company defended its project, claiming that the flood was an inevitable natural disaster that could have occurred regardless of the dam’s construction. The company also emphasized in its response that the project was designed for the benefit of the public rather than for profit.⁶⁰

The conflict surrounding the dam’s construction highlighted the existence of differing perspectives on what “progress” entailed. Some saw the dam as a symbol of progress and believed it should be built, while others criticized its negative economic and ecological impacts on local society. It is important to understand that the development of hydroelectric projects is not a straightforward and simple process of progress, but a multifaceted one. In challenging the conventional modernist or developmentalist discourse that portrays the hydroelectricity project as solely positive, I aim to shed light on the diverse experiences of the different groups involved in and impacted by the project.

The conflict described here raises important questions about who has the right to use the river and what such a right entails. Traditionally, when disputes over access to water resources arose, individuals or families sought the help of respected members of the local gentry or government officials for mediation. These disputes were often resolved based on land rights and the chronological sequence of water use, but they sometimes escalated into inter-clan conflicts.⁶¹ During the War of Resistance against Japan, the Kuomintang government prioritized the use of resources to support the war effort. To this end, in 1942, the government introduced the Shuili Jianshe Gangyao (Principles of Water Conservancy Construction), which emphasized the need to prioritize the demands of the war while ensuring the protection of water sources. The Principles stated that hydroelectric projects should be developed to the fullest extent possible, taking into account the specific industrial and social demands of the time.⁶² It is clear that this conflict over the use of the river reflected the larger issue of who possessed the power to determine how natural resources would be used and developed. While the government’s principles prioritized the needs of the war and reconstruction, it is important to consider the effects on local communities and the environment as well.

As a center of resettlement located near the wartime capital of China, Beibei faced a pressing need for a more stable energy supply. In light of this, elites residing in the area were highly supportive of the Liangtan River hydroelectric project, which appeared poised to receive a water-use permit from the local government. In 1943, the Ba County government dispatched engineers to assess the project and wrote an informal ruling that the company would secure its permit.⁶³ However, in 1947, due to the ongoing controversy surrounding the dam and the devastating flood of 1946, the company was yet to receive the permit.⁶⁴

Despite the lack of a permit, the project was still completed, and electricity was generated for the town of Beibei starting in 1944. However, the lack of a permit was not the only challenge that the project faced. The natural flow of the river posed another challenge: The water level was subject to change, which affected the river’s ability to power the turbines. The engineers had designed the dam with a sluice gate to regulate the water level and thereby ensure consistent power, but the company was unable to build a higher dam due to cost constraints and resistance from local residents. As a result, it was compelled to build a lower dam, which then led to periodic shortages of water for the turbines. During the driest months, the turbines could only run for ten hours per day, which resulted in a limited power supply for the town.⁶⁵

The success of small hydroelectric projects in southwest China was conditioned by several factors. First, the region’s topography, with its waterfall and steep river channels, provided ideal conditions for harnessing hydropower. Also, the availability of steel turbines and electric generators through international trade networks facilitated the implementation of these projects. As the central government in this period was weak and no comprehensive planning was possible, the driving force behind these initiatives was local business and political elites who sought to meet private and civic energy needs. In this context, the role of the state (represented by local officials) was limited to providing support and assistance.

Conclusion

From the beginning, China’s hydroelectric enterprises relied heavily on the advanced technologies developed in Europe and North America. The first hydropower plant in China, Yaolong, was designed by German engineers and imported its major pieces of equipment from Germany. Despite their limited scope, these projects still had a significant impact on local communities. The process of adapting and incorporating new technologies into existing systems is an inescapable element of how the relationships between humans and the environment are shaped.⁶⁶ In the case of the Liangtan River project in Beibei, the construction of the hydropower plant submerged watermills and farmlands, resulting in a loss of access to water for the riverside community. At first, only the more affluent households and businesses in the town benefited from the project, not the farmers whose properties adjoined the river or people living near the dam and the plant.⁶⁷ Although the flood in 1946 was not necessarily caused by the dam, it further impacted the livelihoods of the local residents, who saw the dam as the cause of a man-made disaster. These small-scale projects, which negatively affected a relatively small number of people, nonetheless portended the environmental and social disruptions that would be occasioned by the rapid expansion of hydropower in the second half of the twentieth century. Despite this, the social implications of these projects are usually overlooked in current discussions of the early history of hydropower in China.

With the beginning of the electrical age in the late nineteenth century, China was slow to experience the major technological innovations that were transforming life elsewhere. Despite this, people in China responded quickly to the energy transitions and technological advancements coming from Europe and North America. The emergence of small hydropower plants in southwest China shows that early Chinese responses were not led by the state, which was in disarray at the time. Rather, they were driven by the initiative of private individuals and local elites. These local hydropower projects were fueled by a combination of resistance to foreign influence and a concern for China’s status and prosperity during a tumultuous period. Although China could not be described as a hydropower nation in this period, certain Chinese elites recognized the potential to harness the country’s hydropower resources as a means of securing its future. In response to the deepening national crisis caused by Japanese military aggression and the development of concrete mega-dams, technocrats serving in the Kuomintang government sought to harness the rivers in China’s hinterland for the dual purpose of military resistance and national reconstruction.