Book contents
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- 2 Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk
- 3 Integrating Stakeholder Values into Strategic Planning through Comparative Risk Analysis
- 4 Validating Terrorism Risk Assessment Models – Lessons Learned from 11 Models
- 5 Coping with Uncertainty in Adversarial Risk Analysis
- 6 A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
- 7 Regional Transportation and Supply Chain Modeling for Large-Scale Emergencies
- 8 Economic Consequences of Terrorism and Natural Disasters: The Computable General Equilibrium Approach
- 9 Economic Resilience to Terrorism and Natural Hazards
- 10 The Temporal Regional Economic Impacts of a Hurricane Disaster on Oil Refinery Operations: A FlexNIEMO Approach
- 11 Risk-Informed Benefit-Cost Analysis
- 12 Enhancing Post-disaster Economic Resilience: Public-Private Partnership for Insuring Terrorism
- 13 Economic Impacts of Changes in Wait Times at U.S. Ports of Entry
- 14 Organizational Decision Processes
- 15 A Value Model for Evaluating Homeland Security Decisions
- 16 Identifying, Structuring, and Comparing the Objectives of Al Qaeda and ISIL
- 17 Multi-objective Decision Making: Expected Utility vs. Some Widely Used (and Flawed) Methods
- 18 Achieving Multiple Objectives with Limited Resources: Using Utility Theory and Control Theory
- 19 Defender-Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism
- 20 Decision Making for Bioterror Preparedness: Examples from Smallpox Vaccination Policy
- 21 Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview
- 22 Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games
- 23 Mixed-Integer Optimization Methods for Solving Stackelberg Security Games
- 24 Methods for Addressing the Unpredictable Real-World Element in Security
- 25 Learning to Play Stackelberg Security Games
- 26 Evaluating Deployed Decision Support Systems for Security: Challenges, Analysis, and Approaches
- 27 Homeland Security Resource Allocation Games: Considering Partially Strategic Attackers and Equity
- 28 Decision Analysis by Proxy for Adaptive Adversaries
- 29 Asymmetric Prescriptive/Descriptive Game Theory for Counterterrorism
- 30 Near-Misses and Decision Making Under Uncertainty in the Context of Cybersecurity
- Index
- References
22 - Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 December 2017
Book contents
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Improving Homeland Security Decisions
- 2 Probabilistic Risk Analysis and Terrorism Risk
- 3 Integrating Stakeholder Values into Strategic Planning through Comparative Risk Analysis
- 4 Validating Terrorism Risk Assessment Models – Lessons Learned from 11 Models
- 5 Coping with Uncertainty in Adversarial Risk Analysis
- 6 A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
- 7 Regional Transportation and Supply Chain Modeling for Large-Scale Emergencies
- 8 Economic Consequences of Terrorism and Natural Disasters: The Computable General Equilibrium Approach
- 9 Economic Resilience to Terrorism and Natural Hazards
- 10 The Temporal Regional Economic Impacts of a Hurricane Disaster on Oil Refinery Operations: A FlexNIEMO Approach
- 11 Risk-Informed Benefit-Cost Analysis
- 12 Enhancing Post-disaster Economic Resilience: Public-Private Partnership for Insuring Terrorism
- 13 Economic Impacts of Changes in Wait Times at U.S. Ports of Entry
- 14 Organizational Decision Processes
- 15 A Value Model for Evaluating Homeland Security Decisions
- 16 Identifying, Structuring, and Comparing the Objectives of Al Qaeda and ISIL
- 17 Multi-objective Decision Making: Expected Utility vs. Some Widely Used (and Flawed) Methods
- 18 Achieving Multiple Objectives with Limited Resources: Using Utility Theory and Control Theory
- 19 Defender-Attacker Decision Tree Analysis to Combat Terrorism
- 20 Decision Making for Bioterror Preparedness: Examples from Smallpox Vaccination Policy
- 21 Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) Basics and Application Overview
- 22 Basic Solution Concepts and Algorithms for Stackelberg Security Games
- 23 Mixed-Integer Optimization Methods for Solving Stackelberg Security Games
- 24 Methods for Addressing the Unpredictable Real-World Element in Security
- 25 Learning to Play Stackelberg Security Games
- 26 Evaluating Deployed Decision Support Systems for Security: Challenges, Analysis, and Approaches
- 27 Homeland Security Resource Allocation Games: Considering Partially Strategic Attackers and Equity
- 28 Decision Analysis by Proxy for Adaptive Adversaries
- 29 Asymmetric Prescriptive/Descriptive Game Theory for Counterterrorism
- 30 Near-Misses and Decision Making Under Uncertainty in the Context of Cybersecurity
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Improving Homeland Security Decisions , pp. 508 - 537Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
References
Aghassi, M. & Bertsimas, D. (2006). Robust game theory. Mathematical Programming, 107, 231–273.Google Scholar
Barnhart, C., Johnson, E., Nemhauser, E., Savelsbergh, M., & Vance, P. (1994). Branch and price: Column generation for solving huge integer programs. Operations Research, 46, 316–329.Google Scholar
Basar, T., & Olsder, G. H. (1995). Dynamic noncooperative game theory. 2nd edition. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Ben-Tal, A., & Nemirovski, A. (2002). Robust optimization – methodology and applications. Mathematical Programming, 92, 453–480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bertsimas, D., & Tsitsiklis, J. N. (1994). Introduction to linear optimization. Athena Scientific.Google Scholar
Breton, M., Alg, A., & Haurie, A. (1988). Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games. Optimization Theory and Applications, 59(1), 71–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conitzer, V., & Sandholm, T. (2006). Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM EC-06: 82–90.Google Scholar
Cormen, T. H., Leiserson, C. E., Rivest, R. L., & Stein, C. (2009). Introduction to algorithms. 3rd edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Halvorson, E., Conitzer, V., & Parr, R. (2009). Multi-step multi-sensor hider-seeker games. IJCAI, 336–341.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J.C., & Selten, R. (1972). A generalized Nash solution for two-person bargaining games with incomplete information. Management Science, 18(5), 80–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jain, M., Kardes, E., Kiekintveld, C., Ordóñez, F., & Tambe, M. (2010). Security games with arbitrary schedules: A branch and price approach. AAAI.Google Scholar
Jain, M., Kiekintveld, C., & Tambe, M. (2011). Quality-bounded solutions for finite Bayesian Stackelberg games: Scaling up. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).Google Scholar
Kiekintveld, C., Islam, T., & Kreinovich, V. (2013). Security games with interval uncertainty. In Twelfth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).Google Scholar
Kiekintveld, C., Jain, M., Tsai, J., Pita, J., Tambe, M., & Ordóñez, F. (2009). Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games. In AAMAS-09.Google Scholar
Leitmann, , G. (1978). On generalized Stackelberg strategies. Optimization Theory and Applications, 26(4), 637–643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lerma, O., Kreinovich, V., & Kiekintveld, C. (2011). Linear-time resource allocation in security games with identical fully protective resources. In AAAI Workshop on Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling.Google Scholar
Osbourne, M.J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Paruchuri, P., Pearce, J. P., Marecki, J., Tambe, M., Ordóñez, F., & Kraus, S. (2008). Playing games with security: An efficient exact algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games. In AAMAS-08, 895–902.Google Scholar
Tambe, M. (2011). Security and game theory: Algorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
von Stengel, B., & Zamir, S. (2004). Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies. Technical Report LSE-CDAM-2004-01, CDAM Research Report.Google Scholar
Yin, Z, & Tambe, M. (2012). A unified method for handling discrete and continuous uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg games. In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).Google Scholar