Chapter 2 - The Grounding Challenge

Summary

One way of motivating the PDE is by appealing to our intuitions about cases. We might wonder, however, whether there is any deeper rationale for the principle. In Chapter 2, I argue that proponents of double effect face the grounding challenge: The challenge of providing a theoretical rationale that explains why the distinction between intentional harm and incidental harm is relevant for evaluating the moral permissibility of human conduct. I first show how the PDE accounts for common intuitions about a number of cases that might otherwise seem puzzling. Next, I provide four reasons why the PDE cannot be sufficiently justified solely on the basis of its agreement with case-based intuitions. I then examine six proposed rationales, and I argue that each is vulnerable to serious objections. The thrust of the discussion is therefore critical, but at the end of the chapter, I draw some lessons from the failures of these proposals. This sets the stage for Chapter 3, where I turn to the constructive project of developing a novel rationale.