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David C. Vella

doi:10.1017/9781108568166.013

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2021

David C. Vella

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David C. Vella: Affiliation:
Skidmore College, New York

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Information: Invitation to Linear Programming and Game Theory , pp. 518

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108568166.013 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2021

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References

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