Book contents
- Iran’s Reconstruction Jihad
- Iran’s Reconstruction Jihad
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Introduction
- 1 Inception (1962–1979)
- 2 Expansion (February 11–November 6, 1979)
- 3 Consolidation (1979–1989)
- 4 Demobilization and Institutionalization (1983–2001)
- 5 Disillusionment and Mobility (1983–2001)
- 6 Associationalism (1983–2013)
- 7 Africa (1985–2013)
- 8 Lebanon (1988–2013)
- 9 Jihadi Culture and Management (2005–2017)
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Demobilization and Institutionalization (1983–2001)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2020
- Iran’s Reconstruction Jihad
- Iran’s Reconstruction Jihad
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Introduction
- 1 Inception (1962–1979)
- 2 Expansion (February 11–November 6, 1979)
- 3 Consolidation (1979–1989)
- 4 Demobilization and Institutionalization (1983–2001)
- 5 Disillusionment and Mobility (1983–2001)
- 6 Associationalism (1983–2013)
- 7 Africa (1985–2013)
- 8 Lebanon (1988–2013)
- 9 Jihadi Culture and Management (2005–2017)
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 4 “Demobilization and Institutionalization (1983–2001)” deciphers the mezzo or organizational causes and outcomes of RJ’s institutionalization, which reflected the IRI’s macro or broader changes and continuities. As a revolutionary organization, the resource dependency of RJ on IRP officials rendered it vulnerable to their preferences to convert it into a ministry. Reflecting the IRP’s own trajectory, culminating with its dissolution in 1987, the intensified factionalism that existed between leftist and rightist RJ members rendered the organization susceptible to elite designs regarding its bureaucratization, particularly among IRP rightists who were concerned with its increasing radicalization and influence. While some RJ members vehemently opposed the organization’s institutionalization, the outcome precipitated its transition into a rational-legal administration in three ways. First, as a ministry, RJ achieved greater organizational stability and certainty by delineating clearer and predicable hierarchies, careers, and responsibilities. Second, RJ improved its financial transparency and accountability by subjecting its budget to governmental scrutiny and parliamentary oversight. Third and finally, RJ bolstered its internal professionalization and expertise by investing in recruitment, training, and research.
Keywords
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- Information
- Iran's Reconstruction JihadRural Development and Regime Consolidation after 1979, pp. 125 - 169Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020