7 - Mauritania

Summary

This chapter treats Mauritania as a counter-case that shows how state policies can, in specific circumstances, prevent jihadists from building major local coalitions. Mauritania experienced several significant jihadist attacks between 2005 and 2011 as well as some jihadist recruitment for actions at home and abroad. Yet since 2011, jihadist violence in Mauritania has almost completely fallen off. A “mutaraka” (mutual leaving alone) has arisen between Mauritania and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reflecting a tacit agreement between the Mauritanian state and the Sahara’s jihadists, as well as a tacit understanding between the Mauritanian state and young Mauritanian radicals. These understandings revolve around the state’s non-intervention in northern Mali, the state’s willingness to tolerate strident preaching against democracy and liberalism, the state’s relatively soft treatment of local radicals since 2010, and the state’s abandonment of the use of torture against dissident clerics.