4 - Transcendental Illusion

Summary

In the preceding chapter we saw that Kant's rejection of ontology centers on criticisms of the attempt to acquire knowledge of objects in general simply from the formal (transcendental) concepts and principles of the understanding. Once again, his criticisms are directed toward undermining any transcendental employment of the understanding (in the positive sense). But Kant also takes the transcendental use of the understanding to involve a conflation of appearances and things in themselves, a conflation that carries with it a tendency to apply sensitive conditions beyond the limits of sensibility. In this chapter, our concern is with Kant's subsequent attempt (in the Dialectic) to argue for a unique kind of error referred to as transcendental illusion. In this connection, I argue that the doctrine of transcendental illusion is to be distinguished from the account of the transcendental employment of the understanding. Moreover, because the transcendental employment of the understanding, as well as the conflation of appearances and things in themselves, is what characterizes “transcendental realism,” I further contend that the doctrine of illusion is to be distinguished from the adoption of any transcendentally realistic position. Because of this, Kant's efforts to undermine transcendental realism do not lead to any straightforward rejection of the doctrine of transcendental illusion. More specifically, I contend that even if we were to “rid ourselves” of transcendental realism, we would still, on Kant's view, be subject to transcendental illusion.