Book contents
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the Edition and Translation
- Chronology of the Translated Texts and Kant’s Major Works
- Abbreviations
- Historical and Systematic Introduction
- I Freedom and Determinism
- II Freedom and Imputability
- III Freedom and Consciousness
- Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, “On Freedom,” Berlin, 1788
- Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, “On Moral Freedom,” in Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion, Volume ii, Leipzig, 1791, 56–69
- Johann Heinrich Abicht, “On the Freedom of the Will,” Neues Philosophisches Magazin 1, Part I(III), (Leipzig, 1789), 64–85
- IV Freedom and Skepticism
- V Freedom and Choice
- Appendix: Biographical Sketches
- Glossary
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Persons
- Index of Subjects
Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, “On Moral Freedom,” in Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion, Volume ii, Leipzig, 1791, 56–69
from III - Freedom and Consciousness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2022
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Note on the Edition and Translation
- Chronology of the Translated Texts and Kant’s Major Works
- Abbreviations
- Historical and Systematic Introduction
- I Freedom and Determinism
- II Freedom and Imputability
- III Freedom and Consciousness
- Ludwig Heinrich von Jakob, “On Freedom,” Berlin, 1788
- Karl Heinrich Heydenreich, “On Moral Freedom,” in Betrachtungen über die Philosophie der natürlichen Religion, Volume ii, Leipzig, 1791, 56–69
- Johann Heinrich Abicht, “On the Freedom of the Will,” Neues Philosophisches Magazin 1, Part I(III), (Leipzig, 1789), 64–85
- IV Freedom and Skepticism
- V Freedom and Choice
- Appendix: Biographical Sketches
- Glossary
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index of Persons
- Index of Subjects
Summary
Karl Heinrich Heydenreich contends in “On Moral Freedom” (1791) that the human being is originally endowed with consciousness of freedom. Moreover, Heydenreich explicitly denies that our consciousness of freedom is a consequence of consciousness of the moral law and instead maintains that the moral law provides only indirect support for our innate consciousness of freedom. Similar to Snell’s contention that our freedom is revealed to us through the feeling of our own self, at one point Heydenreich refers to our feeling of freedom. According to Heydenreich, the task of philosophy is to secure this feeling of freedom from the skepticism of speculative reason.
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- Kant's Early Critics on Freedom of the Will , pp. 127 - 134Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022