2 - Caught in between: Kenya’s Foreign Policy and its Relations with China, 1964–1975

Summary

China’s policies in Kenya too were opportunistic, badly conceived and not successful.

Alan Hutchison, 1975

Writing in the 1970s, Alan Hutchison proclaimed his conclusion with confidence: China’s foreign policy goals in Kenya had failed. However, many contemporary observers would be surprised by this verdict. The standard account of Sino-Kenyan relations begins in December 1963 when China became the fourth country to open an embassy in Nairobi, then leaps abruptly to September 1980 when President Daniel arap Moi paid his country’s first state visit to Beijing. This leaves the period of time between 1963 and 1980 almost entirely out of the picture. Terence Ranger has discussed how the ‘the usable past’ can be effective in legitimising nationhood, but it could be said that most of what took place in the 1960s and the 1970s did not conform to the preferred nationalist histories of either Kenya or China. This chapter tackles this omission through an attempt to answer the following questions. Did African countries such as Kenya always submit to powerful Cold War actors? What role did ideology play in Kenyan foreign policy and its relations with Communist China? To what extent did domestic and local politics play into the dynamics of Sino-Kenyan relations? And, driven by Mao’s radical outlook, did China attempt to orchestrate a regime change in Kenya?

This chapter will provide a comprehensive study of the relationship between Kenya and China from 1964 to 1975. Shortly after independence, Kenyan elites continued to develop and deepen relations with China. Nairobi dispatched two delegations, the first to the US in late December 1963, and the second to the USSR and PRC in April-May 1964. Both Communist giants signed economic and technical cooperation agreements with Kenya in the wake of these visits, the Sino-Soviet competition for global influence enabling a relatively small country like Kenya to negotiate a better overall aid package for its own development.

The second part of this chapter will analyse the tri-dimensional nature of post-independence Kenyan politics through the lens of party factions and their respective foreign backers. China’s preference for the most ‘advanced/progressive’ forces in the ‘Third World’ influenced its decision to finance the faction within KANU led by Oginga Odinga.