Book contents
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2019
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Many agree that Frank Jackson’s Mary learns something when she leaves the black-and-white room and finally experiences color firsthand. There is less agreement about what her epistemic progress consists in. According to the new-concepts thesis, it consists at least partly in her acquiring phenomenal-color concepts, that is, concepts associated with knowing what it is like to see in color.
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- The Knowledge Argument , pp. 141 - 160Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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