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I - Theoretical Framework and Policy Issues in Regulating Related Party Transactions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2019

Edited by
Luca Enriques  and
Tobias H. Tröger
Luca Enriques
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
Tobias H. Tröger
Affiliation:
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
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The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions , pp. 21 - 282
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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