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33 - Schaffner on Levels and Selves

from Section 11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2020

By
William Bechtel
Edited by
Kenneth S. Kendler ,
Josef Parnas  and
Peter Zachar
Kenneth S. Kendler
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University
Josef Parnas
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
Peter Zachar
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Montgomery
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Summary

Two concepts figure prominently in Schaffner’s discussion of LeDoux’s account of fear and anxiety: level and self. With respect to level, I differentiate two conceptions of levels invoked in his account: levels of hypotheses (high-level and intermediate-level instantiations) and mechanistic levels involving components within mechanisms. Both are important for Schaffner’s purposes, but they operate differently and should be distinguished. Schaffner’s account of self focuses on personality, but I suggest that more relevant is how one represents oneself, including one’s personality. I develop Neisser’s account of five types of knowledge one might have about oneself and argue that Neisser’s conceptual self is of the most use in understanding LeDoux’s account of fear. I conclude by suggesting how the representation of oneself may be developed differently at different levels of theorizing about oneself.

Keywords

levelsmechanistic levelsselfself-conceptanxiety
Type
Chapter
Information
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
 , pp. 410 - 418
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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