Introduction

Summary

The concept of responsibility would appear to oscillate among (at least) three meanings. On one, to be responsible for P is to be guilty of having done P; on another, to be responsible for P is to be the cause of P; and, on still another, to be responsible for P is to say that there is a case to be put and so a case to be answered. With this last, though guilt is not ascribed, there is present the implication that we shall look into the answer that is forthcoming. Different aspects of these three meanings of the term, particularly the last two, which readers may well think of prime importance, are explored in this volume. Here, we touch only upon some of the pertinent issues.

RESPONSIBILITY: SOME CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS

To be responsible, in a sense that matters in law and morals, is minimally to be accountable or answerable for one's actions (or omissions). We are responsible for some consequences of our acts (or omissions), but not for others. The bases of the distinctions that we draw, and those that we ought to draw, are matters of great controversy, not least because of the obscurity of the notions of act and intention. The contributors to this section address three important matters of controversy, each of which attempts to resolve issues central to a theory of responsibility.