Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Formal Model of Outbidding
- 3 The Evidence
- 4 Outbidding, Capacity, and Government Enforcement
- 5 Outbidding as Deterrence: Endogenous Demands in the Shadow of Group Competition
- 6 Cornering the Market: Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Group Formation
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 September 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- List of Figures
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Formal Model of Outbidding
- 3 The Evidence
- 4 Outbidding, Capacity, and Government Enforcement
- 5 Outbidding as Deterrence: Endogenous Demands in the Shadow of Group Competition
- 6 Cornering the Market: Counterterrorism in the Shadow of Group Formation
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter reflects on the generalizable lessons that our theoretical and empirical results generate. Two central ideas emerge. First, strategic interaction is a central component of political violence. Failure to account for it risks generating invalid theoretical mechanisms and ineffective policy recommendations. Second, there is no silver bullet for terrorism. Some policies may be more effective on average than others. But even some seemingly sensible solutions can backfire under the wrong circumstances. As such, policymakers wishing to influence political violence outcomes must have a strong understanding of the causal process that guides the violence before making interventions. We also unite various subthemes that have reoccurred throughout the book, such as the role international institutions play in affecting terrorism patterns.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Militant CompetitionHow Terrorists and Insurgents Advertise with Violence and How They Can Be Stopped, pp. 222 - 238Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021