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14 - On First-Person Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Jane Heal
Affiliation:
St John's College, Cambridge
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

What people say, in the first person and present tense, about their own thoughts is treated as authoritative. This is not to say that such remarks (avowals) are unquestionable. A person's claims about her beliefs, intentions, feelings, sensations and so on can be challenged. But the doubt usually centres on the speaker's sincerity or command of language rather than on the idea of her being in plain honest error. About some subject matters, for example the properties of objects in the material world or others' thoughts, one can easily be in plain honest error, and in ways which bring no criticism upon one. For example, the error may come about because the world has coincidentally piled up misleading evidence or because others have conspired to deceive one. About one's own thoughts, however, one cannot, in this everyday manner, just be mistaken. This is not to deny that there are cases where a sincere avowal seems so much at odds with other evidence that we cannot endorse it. But in such cases we find that the rejected avowal still retains a kind of shadowy credence. We are inclined to say that the person ‘sort of’ believes or intends as she insists she does. But at the same time we do not think her fault-free. Instead notions like self-deception and failure of rationality get a grip.

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Mind, Reason and Imagination
Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language
, pp. 273 - 288
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

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  • On First-Person Authority
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.016
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  • On First-Person Authority
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.016
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • On First-Person Authority
  • Jane Heal, St John's College, Cambridge
  • Book: Mind, Reason and Imagination
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511615894.016
Available formats
×