Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2022
Moral philosophy characteristically sees moral standards as reasons. That an action would be kind or just or in some way morally admirable is supposed to give us a reason for performing it. And surely there is something right about the thought that moral standards imply reasons for conforming to them. For we offer the morality of an action as a relevant consideration in practical argument—a consideration to support that action’s performance. You should provide the help, because it would be kind, or just, and so forth. And an argument, surely, is in the business of offering reasons for what the argument supports.
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