Book contents
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Sources
- Introduction: Rorty as a Critical Philosopher
- I Early Papers
- II Later Papers
- 9 Philosophy as Epistemology: Reply to Hacking and Kim
- 10 Naturalized Epistemology and Norms: Replies to Goldman and Fodor
- 11 The Objectivity of Values
- 12 What Is Dead in Plato
- 13 The Current State of Philosophy in the United States
- 14 Brandom’s Conversationalism: Davidson and Making It Explicit
- 15 Bald Naturalism and McDowell’s Hylomorphism
- 16 Reductionist vs. Neo-Wittgensteinian Semantics
- 17 Remarks on Nishida and Nishitani
- Index of Names
14 - Brandom’s Conversationalism: Davidson and Making It Explicit
from II - Later Papers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2020
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Sources
- Introduction: Rorty as a Critical Philosopher
- I Early Papers
- II Later Papers
- 9 Philosophy as Epistemology: Reply to Hacking and Kim
- 10 Naturalized Epistemology and Norms: Replies to Goldman and Fodor
- 11 The Objectivity of Values
- 12 What Is Dead in Plato
- 13 The Current State of Philosophy in the United States
- 14 Brandom’s Conversationalism: Davidson and Making It Explicit
- 15 Bald Naturalism and McDowell’s Hylomorphism
- 16 Reductionist vs. Neo-Wittgensteinian Semantics
- 17 Remarks on Nishida and Nishitani
- Index of Names
Summary
In “Brandom’s Conversationalism: Davidson and Making It Explicit,” Rorty offers a clear and concise summary of the main argument of Brandom’s book its proximity to Davidson’s thought, and its particular limitations. Rorty takes the reader through a careful, point-by-point explication of where in their respective texts Brandom and Davidson endorse each other’s positions and where the apparent divergences in their attempts to naturalize semantics and philosophy of mind are not differences that make a difference. Rorty pays particular attention to where Brandom violates his claim that “there is no realm in which concepts do not apply” to endorse the existence of nonlinguistic facts.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- On Philosophy and PhilosophersUnpublished Papers, 1960–2000, pp. 203 - 213Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020