Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Part I Introduction and history
- Part II Conceptions of organizational control
- Part III Identity, attention, and motivation in organizational control
- Part IV Relational control
- Part V Managerial and strategic control
- 12 Control to cooperation: examining the role of managerial authority in portfolios of managerial actions
- 13 Consequences and antecedents of managerial and employee legitimacy interpretations of control: a natural open system approach
- 14 Managerial objectives of formal control: high motivation control mechanisms
- 15 Control configurations and strategic initiatives
- Index of terms
- Author index
- References
12 - Control to cooperation: examining the role of managerial authority in portfolios of managerial actions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Contributors
- Foreword
- Part I Introduction and history
- Part II Conceptions of organizational control
- Part III Identity, attention, and motivation in organizational control
- Part IV Relational control
- Part V Managerial and strategic control
- 12 Control to cooperation: examining the role of managerial authority in portfolios of managerial actions
- 13 Consequences and antecedents of managerial and employee legitimacy interpretations of control: a natural open system approach
- 14 Managerial objectives of formal control: high motivation control mechanisms
- 15 Control configurations and strategic initiatives
- Index of terms
- Author index
- References
Summary
This chapter presents a new theoretical direction for control research. Managerial controls that comprise the primary focus of this research describe the various initiatives managers undertake to motivate, evaluate, and reward subordinates for performing work in ways consistent with the achievement of an organization's interests, goals, and strategies (Merchant,1985). From the earliest research on organizations, the act of controlling subordinates has been recognized as one of a manager's primary functions (Blau and Scott, 1962). Since that time, researchers have identified various mechanisms by which managers exercise control in their organizations including the development and implementation of formal policies (Barnard, 1938), rational-legal authority and rules (Weber, 1968[1918]), cultural norms and rituals (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979), or incentive systems, direct supervision, and/or work designs (Mintzberg, 1979).
While traditional control theory focuses primarily on how managers exercise their power through applications of managerial controls, I propose here that a more deliberate consideration of how managers develop and utilize their managerial authority may help scholars formulate more realistic pictures of managerial attention and action (Ocasio, 1997) and better comprehend how managers actually cultivate high levels of superior–subordinate cooperation.
Managerial authority refers to a person's right to exercise power based on the belief that his or her actions are legitimate and in alignment with accepted standards of appropriate conduct. I specifically argue that a manager's interest in preserving, protecting, and promoting his/her managerial authority constitutes a primary motivation for managerial action.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Organizational Control , pp. 365 - 395Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
References
1965. Inequity of social exchange. In (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology:279–299. New York, NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar
and 1992. Design and devotion: surges of rational and normative ideologies of control in managerial discourse. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37: 363–399.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1994. Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 15: 175–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. Organizational economics: understanding the relationship between organizations and economic analysis. In , , and (eds.), Handbook of organization studies: 115–147. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
2003. Organizational dispute resolution systems: a complementarities perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 28: 643–656.Google Scholar
and 1986. Interactional justice: communication criteria of fairness. In , , and (eds.), Research in negotiation in organizations: 43–55. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.Google Scholar
and 1989. Price, authority, and trust: from ideal types to plural forms. Annual review of sociology, 15: 97–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2001. Technological innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: managing research and development using input, behavior, and output controls. Organization Science, 12: 19–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2004. Balancing and rebalancing in the creation and evolution of organizational control. Organization Science, 15: 411–431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. Reward allocation preferences in groups and organizations. The International Journal of Conflict Management, 4: 25–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. Between trust and control: developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review, 23: 491–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1982. Justice in the “crunch.” In and (eds.), The justice motive in social behavior: 343–357. New York, NY: Plenum Press.Google Scholar
and 2002. Trust in leadership: meta-analytic findings and implications for research and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87: 611–628.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
, , and 1998. Understanding the influence of national culture on the development of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23: 601–620.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 31: 57–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. Surveillant intentions and intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64: 257–266.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1998. When tough times make tough bosses: managerial distancing as a function of layoff blame. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 100–108.Google Scholar
and 1996. Bad for practice: a critique of the transaction cost theory. Academy of Management Review, 1: 13–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1987. A taxonomy of organizational justice theories. Academy of Management Review, 12: 9–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1978. Authority, power, influence, and social control: a theoretical synthesis. Academy of Management Review, 3: 724–725.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1998. Introduction: critical theory perspectives on control. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43: 235–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1997. Fair process: managing in the knowledge economy. Harvard Business Review, 38: 65–75.Google Scholar
1996. The management of complex tasks in organizations: controlling the systems development process. Organization Science, 7: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1977. The justice motive: some hypotheses as to its origins and forms. Journal of Personality, 45: 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1980. Beyond fairness: a theory of allocation preferences. In (ed.), Justice and social interaction:167–218. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.Google Scholar
and 1996. Developing and maintaining trust in work relationships. In and (eds.), Trust in organizations: frontiers of theory and research:114–139. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1999. The co-evolution of new organizational forms. Organization Science, 10: 535–550.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1988. The social psychology of procedural justice. New York, NY: Plenum Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 2010. Fairness monitoring: contextualizing fairness judgments in organizations.
and 2006. Trust in the balance: how managers integrate trust-building and task control. In and (eds.), Handbook of trust research. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
, , and 2002. Three controls are better than one: a computational model of complex control systems. Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 8: 197–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1995. An integrative model of organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20: 709–734.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1989. Managing to be fair: an exploration of values, motives, and leadership. Administrative Science Quarterly, 34: 252–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. The problem of contract enforcement in economic organization theory. Organization Studies, 13: 292–343.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1997. Toward an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 187–206.3.3.CO;2-B>CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1979. A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms. Management Science, 25: 833–848.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1980. Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 129–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , , and 1998. Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust. Academy of Management Review, 23: 393–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1986. When managers decide not to decide autocratically: an investigation of leader-member exchange and decision influence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71: 579–584.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1998. A within- and between-groups analysis of leader-member exchange as a correlate of delegation and as a moderator of delegation relationships with performance and satisfaction. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 298–318.Google Scholar
and 2007. Trust, control and risk: a test of Das and Teng's conceptual framework for pharmaceutical buyer–supplier relationships. Group and Organization Management, 32: 430–464.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995. On the positive effect of legalization on trust. In , , and (eds.), Research on negotiations in organizations:185–217. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.Google Scholar
and 1994. The legalization of organizations: a multi-theoretical perspective. In and (eds.), The legalistic organization:19–49. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
and 2005. Managerial trust-building through the use of legitimating formal and informal control mechanisms. International Sociology, 20: 307–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1993. Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic remedies for trust/distrust. Organization Science, 4: 367–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1996. The road to hell: the dynamics of distrust in an era of quality. In and (eds.), Trust in organizations: frontiers in theory and research:196–215. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1992. Control theory in strategic human resource management: the mediating effect of administrative information. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 292–327.Google Scholar
and 1999. Giving up control without losing control: trust and its substitutes' effects on managers involving employees in decision making. Group and Organization Management, 24: 155–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1995. Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20: 571–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1992. A relational model of authority in groups. In (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology:151–191. New York, NY: Academic Press.Google Scholar
and 1979. Toward a theory of organizational socialization. In and (eds.), Research in organizational behavior:209–264. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.Google Scholar
1968. Economy and society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (original work published in 1918).Google Scholar
, , , and 1998. Managers as initiators of trust: an exchange relationship framework for understanding managerial trustworthy behavior. Academy of Management Review, 23: 513–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, , and 1999. The structure of optimal trust: moral and strategic implications. Academy of Management Review, 24: 99–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
and 1983. Efficient cultures: exploring the relationship between culture and organizational performance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 468–481.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
1986. Production of trust: institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. In and (eds.), Research in organizational behavior:53–111. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.Google Scholar
- 13
- Cited by