Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- A THE FOUNDATION: THEORY AND PRINCIPLES
- B GENETICS AND THE NEWBORN
- C THERAPIES
- 12 Rationality, Personhood, and Peter Singer on the Fate of Severely Impaired Infants
- 13 The Ethics of Controlling Reproduction in a Population with Mental Disabilities
- 14 Pediatric Innovative Surgery
- 15 Conjoined Twins
- 16 Ethics and Immunization
- 17 Psychotropic Drug Use in Children: The Case of Stimulants
- D END OF LIFE
- Index
12 - Rationality, Personhood, and Peter Singer on the Fate of Severely Impaired Infants
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- A THE FOUNDATION: THEORY AND PRINCIPLES
- B GENETICS AND THE NEWBORN
- C THERAPIES
- 12 Rationality, Personhood, and Peter Singer on the Fate of Severely Impaired Infants
- 13 The Ethics of Controlling Reproduction in a Population with Mental Disabilities
- 14 Pediatric Innovative Surgery
- 15 Conjoined Twins
- 16 Ethics and Immunization
- 17 Psychotropic Drug Use in Children: The Case of Stimulants
- D END OF LIFE
- Index
Summary
“The one thing having a child does is make a philosopher out of a parent.” So opens an op-ed piece in the aftermath of the infamous Baby Doe case, an infant with Down syndrome whose parents reluctantly made a decision to let their infant die. If having a child makes every parent a philosopher, having a child with cognitive disabilities makes a philosopher who becomes a parent a far humbler philosopher.
I was a philosophy graduate student when my daughter Sesha was born. She was picture-perfect at birth. It wasn't until Sesha was 4 months old that we suspected a problem. At 6 months, our pediatric neurologist suggested that we visit another doctor for an assessment. This neurologist gave us the news straight – straight up, nosoda, noice, and no palliatives. A two-minute exam and the words “Your daughter is severely to profoundly retarded.” When we returned home, I was violently ill. My poor husband had to care for both Sesha and me that terrible night.
Now, I am not suggesting that I took the news worse because philosophy was my chosen trade. But loving Sesha and loving the life of the mind forced me to think – to feel – differently about that latter love. My own child could not share its treasures, could not even remotely approach that which had, I had thought, given my life its meaning. I hadto reassess the meaning and value of cognitive capacities as the defining feature of humanity. I discovered that a love for one's child transcended any denumerable set of defining characteristics.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Pediatric Bioethics , pp. 165 - 172Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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