Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- The philosophy of animal minds: an introduction
- 1 What do animals think?
- 2 Attributing mental representations to animals
- 3 Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition
- 4 Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
- 5 Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
- 6 A language of baboon thought?
- 7 Animal communication and neo-expressivism
- 8 Mindreading in the animal kingdom
- 9 The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposal
- 10 Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts
- 11 Self-awareness in animals
- 12 The sophistication of non-human emotion
- 13 Parsimony and models of animal minds
- 14 The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology
- Glossary of key terms
- References
- Index
1 - What do animals think?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Acknowledgments
- The philosophy of animal minds: an introduction
- 1 What do animals think?
- 2 Attributing mental representations to animals
- 3 Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognition
- 4 Systematicity and intentional realism in honeybee navigation
- 5 Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win)
- 6 A language of baboon thought?
- 7 Animal communication and neo-expressivism
- 8 Mindreading in the animal kingdom
- 9 The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposal
- 10 Animals, consciousness, and I-thoughts
- 11 Self-awareness in animals
- 12 The sophistication of non-human emotion
- 13 Parsimony and models of animal minds
- 14 The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology
- Glossary of key terms
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
You may have noticed that the title of this essay is ambiguous. Asking what animals think could be part of an inquiry into animal public opinion, focusing perhaps on such questions as what apes think about the Endangered Species Act or whether frogs prefer Tom Waits to Leonard Cohen. Or if you read the right punctuation into the title you might see it as an exclamation of surprise: “What! Do animals think?” What I am actually concerned with in this essay is how we should think about specifying exactly what it is that a particular animal thinks on a particular occasion. Some would say that I am concerned with the problem of content as it applies to non-human animals.
The first response to the question of what animals think may be to say that they think thoughts. This is harmless, so long as we do not succumb to the temptation of reading psychology or ontology directly off of the language. However, it is downright harmful if, after assimilating thinking to having a thought, we go on to suppose that having a thought is the same as having a propositional attitude. At the outset, anyway, I want to leave open a wide range of possibilities including whether animal thinking implies having propositional attitudes; and if it does, the meaning, status, and nature of these propositional attitudes.
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- The Philosophy of Animal Minds , pp. 15 - 34Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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